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THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO TAX
Daniel J. Hemel†
Existing statutes give the President and his Treasury De-
partment broad authority to implement important elements of
the administration’s tax agenda without further congressional
action.  And yet only occasionally does the executive branch
exercise this statutory “power to tax.”  Instead, the President
often asks Congress to pass revenue-raising measures achiev-
ing what the President and his Treasury Department already
could accomplish on their own.  And even when Congress re-
buffs the President’s request, past administrations only rarely
have responded by exercising the regulatory authority they
already possess.  All the while, past Presidents have
stretched the limits of executive authority in a taxpayer-
friendly direction—even over Congress’s expressed
preferences.
This Article attempts to explain the peculiar patterns of
executive action and inaction observed in the tax policymaking
domain.  It draws on public choice theory and game theory to
build a strategic model of interactions between the executive
and legislative branches.  The model generates several
counterintuitive implications.  Among others: a strong anti-tax
faction in Congress may increase the probability that revenue-
raising regulatory measures are implemented; judicial defer-
ence to Treasury regulations may reduce lawmakers’ willing-
ness to pass revenue-raising fixes to existing tax statutes; and
statutory rules requiring legislation to be “deficit-neutral” may
discourage the administration from taking deficit-closing regu-
latory actions.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2016, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew announced
new temporary regulations making it more difficult for a foreign
company to acquire a larger American company without trig-
gering the adverse tax consequences of an “inversion.”1  At the
same time, the Treasury published proposed regulations ad-
dressing so-called “earnings stripping” transactions that shift
corporate profits from the United States to lower tax jurisdic-
tions; the proposed rules characterize certain interests as stock
instead of indebtedness to prevent U.S. corporations from
claiming interest deductions on payments to their foreign affili-
ates.2  President Obama told reporters at a White House press
conference the following day that he “wanted to make sure that
we highlighted the importance of Treasury’s action.”  He also
used the occasion as an opportunity to lambaste lawmakers for
their inaction on inversions.  “I want to be clear,” President
Obama said.
While the Treasury Department actions will make it more
difficult and less lucrative for companies to exploit this par-
ticular corporate inversions loophole, only Congress can
close it for good, and only Congress can make sure that all
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Additional
Action to Curb Inversions, Address Earnings Stripping (Apr. 4, 2016), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0405.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/9XLE-RUH9]. See T.D. 9761, 2016-20 I.R.B. 743 (May 16, 2016).
2 Prop. Treas. Reg §§ 1.385-1 to -4, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,912, 20,914 (Apr. 8,
2016).
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the other loopholes that are being taken advantage of are
closed. . . .  So far, Republicans in Congress have yet to act.3
Reaction was swift.  Hours after the President’s press con-
ference, news leaked that the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer had
called off its plans to merge with the Irish-headquartered Aller-
gan—a transaction that was initially structured to avoid the
inversion rules but that would have been caught up in the new
temporary regulations’ sweep.4  Pfizer’s chief executive officer,
Ian Read, took to the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal to
assail the Obama administration’s “ad hoc and arbitrary” ac-
tion as “unprecedented, unproductive and harmful to the U.S.
economy.”5  Inches away, the Journal’s editorial board said that
the Treasury’s “rewrite of longstanding U.S. tax law” was “law-
less” and “would almost surely be thrown out if it were chal-
lenged in court.”  Defending Pfizer and other firms involved in
transactions targeted by the new rules, the Journal board said
that “these companies are acting legally and behaving ration-
ally under the law that Congress has written.”6
In fact, the laws that Congress has written delegate broad
power to the Treasury Department to take the sorts of actions
that President Obama and Secretary Lew announced in April.
Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code, which addresses
inversions, authorizes the Treasury Secretary to promulgate
“regulations providing for such adjustments to the application
of this section as are necessary to prevent the avoidance of the
purposes of this section.”7  Section 385, the statute that the
Treasury invoked in its earnings stripping proposal, authorizes
the Treasury Secretary “to prescribe such regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest
in a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as
stock or indebtedness.”8  On the one hand, these statutory pro-
visions undermine President Obama’s claim that Congress has
3 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on the
Economy (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/
04/05/remarks-president-economy-0 [perma.cc/DPC8-ZHBM].
4 Michael J. de la Merced & Leslie Picker, Pfizer and Allergan Are Said to End
Merger as Tax Rules Tighten, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/06/business/dealbook/tax-inversion-obama-treasury.html [https://
perma.cc/E49C-EBXD].
5 Ian Read, Opinion, Treasury Is Wrong About Our Merger and Growth, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2016, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-is-wrong-
about-our-merger-and-growth-1459983997 [https://perma.cc/9MHV-ZKG8].
6 Opinion, Jack Lew’s Corporate Tax Ambush, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2016, 3:16
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-lews-corporate-tax-ambush-
1459900261 [https://perma.cc/SHY8-VT7A].
7 I.R.C. § 7874(g) (2012).
8 I.R.C. § 385(a) (2012).
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failed to take action against inversions: a Republican-led Con-
gress did act in 2004 by passing section 7874, which gave the
Treasury Secretary the power to close loopholes.9  (A Demo-
cratic-majority Congress also acted in 1969 by passing section
385, although it is doubtful that inversions were on anyone’s
mind at the time.10)  On the other hand, these statutory provi-
sions also undermine the Wall Street Journal editorial board’s
claim that the Obama administration is “rewrit[ing]” the tax
laws.  The laws themselves give the administration wide leeway
to define the rules of the game.11
But in at least one sense, Pfizer’s CEO was quite right to
say that the Obama administration’s approach was “unprece-
dented”—or close to it.  (I will leave it to others to assess Ian
Read’s claims that the April 2016 actions were “unproductive”
and “harmful to the U.S. economy”;12 my goal here is not to
explore the merits of the administration’s actions but instead
to focus on the form those actions took.)  Rarely, if ever, has a
President publicly taken ownership of a tax-related Treasury
decision, much less a decision that moved the dial in a tax-
payer-unfriendly direction.13  In this respect, the Obama ad-
ministration’s April 2016 actions on inversions and earnings
stripping were indeed “unprecedented”—or, more precisely,
unprecedented in the history of tax policy.
Of course, presidential administrations oftentimes take
unilateral action in areas other than tax, and Presidents often-
times take personal and political ownership of such measures.
The Obama administration also used regulatory authority to
nearly double fuel economy standards for cars and light-duty
9 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118
Stat. 1562.
10 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 613.
11 Jack Lew’s Corporate Tax Ambush, supra note 6. R
12 Compare, e.g., Editorial, A Corporate Tax Dodge Gets Harder, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/opinion/a-corporate-tax-
dodge-gets-harder.html [https://perma.cc/XD57-5QQ8], with Diana Furchtgott-
Roth, Opinion, Free Pfizer! Why Inversions Are Good for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/opinion/free-pfizer-why-inver-
sions-are-good-for-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/9A3W-B3JY].
13 In conversations with the author, Treasury officials from the past six ad-
ministrations could name no similar example of a President claiming credit for a
revenue-raising regulatory measure.
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trucks,14 to implement “commonsense” gun safety measures,15
to ban “trans fat” from most food products,16 to restrict carbon
emissions from power plants,17 to extend overtime pay to mil-
lions more workers,18 and to grant “deferred action” status to
hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants who
came to the United States as children.19  (The carbon emissions
regulations have been stayed by the Supreme Court,20 and the
Justices by a 4-4 vote recently affirmed a lower court decision
striking down the deferred action expansion.21)  The adminis-
tration of George W. Bush, for its part, used its regulatory
authority with particular vigor in the waning days of Bush’s
second term, acting to ease rules on strip mining and coal
power plant construction, open millions of acres to oil shale
drilling, and allow individuals to carry concealed and loaded
14 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Administra-
tion Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/obama-administra-
tion-finalizes-historic-545-mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard [https://perma.cc/
6JQ7-7NC7].
15 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: New
Executive Actions to Reduce Gun Violence and Make Our Communities Safer
(Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/04/fact-
sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our [https://perma
.cc/AQN3-FK5F].  Among other measures, the President announced that the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms would finalize a rule requiring background
checks for additional gun purchases; the Social Security Administration would
begin a rulemaking process with the goal of allowing mental health information
regarding beneficiaries to be incorporated into the background check system; and
the Department of Health and Human Services would finalize a rule amending
privacy protections under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) so that state health officials could share mental health records of poten-
tial gun purchasers with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
16 Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg.
34,650, 34,650 (June 17, 2015).
17 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
18 See Jonnelle Marte, Millions More Workers Will Be Eligible for Overtime Pay
Under New Federal Rule, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/get-there/wp/2016/05/17/millions-more-workers-would-be-el-
igible-for-overtime-pay-under-new-federal-rule [https://perma.cc/B4Z8-M74R]
(noting that President Obama would announce the new rules alongside his Labor
Secretary).
19 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Indi-
viduals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www
.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-
who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDP9-6QFY].
20 See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016) (mem.)
(order granting stay).
21 See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271  (2016) (mem.).
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weapons in national parks, among other measures.22  The
Clinton administration acted unilaterally to outlaw smoking in
federal buildings, ban the importation of dozens of types of
semiautomatic weapons, and turn millions of acres in the West
and Southwest into national monuments, among other mea-
sures.23  Indeed, at the end of the Clinton years then-professor
Elena Kagan already could declare that “[w]e live today in an
era of presidential administration,”24 and her claim is—if any-
thing—truer today than it was a decade and a half ago.
Tax, though, has followed a somewhat different pattern.
Rather than acting on their own or through their Treasury
Secretaries, recent Presidents have repeatedly asked Congress
to close “loopholes”25 in the tax laws—even when existing stat-
utes gave them ample (or at least arguable) authority to enact a
desired change, and even when legislative gridlock made it ex-
ceedingly unlikely that Congress would act.26  Each year, each
President since George H.W. Bush has presented a set of sug-
gested tax law reforms to Congress—compiled in a single vol-
ume colloquially known as the “Greenbook” because of its
distinctive green cover.27  Almost invariably, the Greenbook in-
cludes proposals that the President plausibly could carry out
on his own—without any congressional action—by directing
22 Paul Harris, Bush Sneaks Through Host of Laws to Undermine Obama, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/14/
george-bush-midnight-regulations [https://perma.cc/2DBJ-HYRR].
23 See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 5–6 (2003).
24 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246
(2001).
25 As Joseph Pechman noted, “A provision which is regarded as a loophole for
one group is often justified as a major improvement in equity or as essential to
promote economic growth by another.”  Joseph A. Pechman, Comprehensive In-
come Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63, 66 (1967).  This Article avoids the
term from here on out.
26 See infra subparts I.D–E.
27 Greenbooks from fiscal year 1990 to the present are available at Adminis-
tration’s Fiscal Year Revenue Proposals, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/general_explanation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D4S7-ZSJM] (last updated May 18, 2016).  The Greenbook is
not to be confused with the Bluebook, which is prepared by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation at the end of each Congress and which explains all tax
provisions actually enacted during the previous congressional session.  See Joint
Committee Bluebooks, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, https://www.jct.gov/publica-
tions.html?func=select&id=9 [https://perma.cc/842L-AXHX].
Complicating matters somewhat, the administration of George W. Bush used
a blue cover for its books of revenue proposals. See Warren Rojas, Bush Tax
Credit Aims To Make Housing Dreams Come True, 91 TAX NOTES 375, 375 (2001).
The Obama administration restored the cover to the color green. See Tim Tuerff et
al., Obama Proposals Would Topple Long-Standing Tax Framework, 54 TAX NOTES
INT’L 657, 657 (2009).
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the Treasury Department to promulgate appropriate regula-
tions.  Recent examples include:
• Requiring managers of private equity, venture capital,
and hedge funds to pay tax on carried interest profits at
ordinary income rates rather than capital gains rates;28
• Restricting the use of “check-the-box” rules to create
stateless income;29
• Preventing oil and gas companies and other taxpayers
from claiming foreign tax credits where the relevant for-
eign country imposes no general tax;30
• Repealing the lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM) inventory
accounting method;31
• Preventing taxpayers from avoiding gift taxes through
“zeroed-out” grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs);32
• Disallowing deductions for “charitable” contributions of
rights to airspace above historic homes;33 and
• Denying a deduction for payment of punitive damages.34
Several of these measures have appeared in multiple years’
Greenbooks: the proposal to eliminate the carried interest pref-
erence, for example, appeared in the Greenbook every year of
the Obama administration.35  Year after year, Congress rebuf-
fed the President’s request.36  Surely by the last year of the
28 See infra section I.E.1.
29 See infra section I.E.2.
30 See infra section I.E.3.
31 See infra section I.E.4.
32 See infra section I.E.5.
33 See infra section I.E.6.
34 See infra section I.E.7.
35 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 23–24 (2009) [hereinafter FY 2010
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 91–92 (2010) [hereinafter FY 2011
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 REVENUE PROPOSALS 61–62 (2011) [hereinafter FY 2012
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 134–35 (2012) [hereinafter FY 2013
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 159–60 (2013) [hereinafter FY 2014
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 177–78 (2014) [hereinafter FY 2015
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 163–64 (2015) [hereinafter FY 2016
Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 162–63 (2016) [hereinafter FY 2017
Greenbook].
36 See Jackie Calmes, Carried-Interest Tax Break Divides Again, After Trump
Revives the Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/19/business/carried-interest-tax-break-divides-again-after-trump-revives-
the-issue.html [https://perma.cc/QRU2-CQTZ].
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Obama administration, Treasury officials harbored no illusions
that Congress would pass these measures.  Why did the ad-
ministration not act on its own?
To be sure, if the executive branch acted alone to imple-
ment these tax law changes, its actions would likely face chal-
lenge in court.  On some of the above issues (e.g., limiting the
ability of oil, gas, and other companies to claim foreign tax
credits where no foreign tax was paid), the administration
would almost certainly prevail; on other issues (e.g., carried
interest and punitive damages) the administration’s authority
is somewhat less clear.37  And yet the risk of litigation hardly
explains the Obama administration’s reluctance to act on its
own: after all, the administration routinely faced (and some-
times lost) challenges to unilateral action in other areas, rang-
ing from immigration38 to air pollution39 to corporate
governance.40  What explains the reluctance of the Obama ad-
ministration and its predecessors to raise revenue via executive
action when the path to legislative reform was obstructed?
This Article offers a first cut at answering that question.  I
say it is a “first cut” because the question has thus far gone
almost entirely unasked.41  While others have noted that the
administration likely could end the carried interest preference
37 See infra subpart I.E.
38 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
39 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
40 See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
41 Daniel Berman and Victoria Haneman briefly address the question in their
otherwise-comprehensive overview of tax policymaking. See DANIEL M. BERMAN &
VICTORIA J. HANEMAN, MAKING TAX LAW 196 (2014) (“[W]hy would the Administration
submit a legislative proposal to override regulations issued by its own Treasury
Department, when the Treasury Department could simply and quickly change the
regulations on its on [sic]?”).  Berman and Haneman suggest that the answer has
to do with the fact that “[n]either the Joint Committee on Taxation nor the Trea-
sury Department prepares a revenue estimate for a proposed regulation.” Id.  So
while “the Treasury Department has the authority to simply revise or revoke
regulations,” Berman and Haneman posit that “the Administration may want to
capture the measurable increase in revenue . . . and to do so, the change or
revocation must be enacted by statute.” Id.
Berman and Haneman’s explanation is illuminating but incomplete.  The
Treasury Department could solve the problem identified by Berman and Haneman
by generating its own revenue estimates for regulations.  Indeed, the Treasury
already estimates the revenue effects of each legislative proposal in the Green-
book.  The fact that the Treasury refrains from estimating the revenue effects of
regulations may be a consequence of its reluctance to implement revenue-raising
regulations sua sponte; but given that the Treasury could easily reverse this
policy, it is difficult to see how the lack of revenue estimates for regulations could
play a significant causal role.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 10 20-MAR-17 15:29
642 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:633
without Congress,42 this Article shows that the carried interest
example is part of a larger pattern.  Recent Greenbooks are
replete with proposals that could be accomplished by regula-
tion: in many cases, the President asks Congress to fix a flaw
created by Treasury rules—rules that the administration has
authority to repeal.43  Moreover, this pattern is not specific to
the Obama administration: a review of Greenbooks since 1990
turns up numerous examples in which the President has asked
Congress to do what his administration could do on its own.44
Part I of the Article lays out the legal and institutional
landscape.  Part II offers several possible reasons why a Presi-
dent and his administration might decline to pursue revenue-
raising regulatory measures—even when the same President
supports legislation that would accomplish the same result.  I
start with a rudimentary model in which politicians take ac-
tions when the political costs exceed the political benefits.  I
then complicate the model by envisioning two actors—the Pres-
ident and Congress—whose political fortunes are separate.
Voters and interest groups allocate credit and blame between
the President and Congress based on each actor’s role in the
policymaking process: when the executive branch acts unilat-
erally, the President reaps all the credit but bears all the blame;
when Congress passes legislation that the President signs,
Congress and the President share credit and blame proportion-
ally.  I add the further constraint that the President cannot
spend government funds on his own; all appropriations legisla-
tion must go through Congress.  With this additional con-
straint, the two-branch model suggests an asymmetry between
non-tax and tax matters.  On the non-tax side, any policy that
the President is willing to sign into law is also a policy that he
would implement via regulation—i.e., any policy for which the
political benefits exceed the political costs.  On the tax side,
however, the President bears all the political costs of executive
actions that raise revenue, but shares the political benefits of
additional spending with Congress.  The model predicts that
there will be some revenue-raising measures that the President
would sign if they came to his desk in the form of legislation
(because he would then share the political costs with Congress)
but that he would not want to implement via regulation (be-
42 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty Revisited: Taxing Carried Interest as
Ordinary Income Through Executive Action Instead of Legislation 14–15 (Sept. 2,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2661623.
43 See infra notes 110, 131–140, 144–147, 155–159, and accompanying text. R
44 See infra notes 148–149, 158, 215, 221, 230, and accompanying text. R
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cause he would then bear the political costs all himself).  The
model also predicts an additional asymmetry within tax law:
the President will be less willing to promulgate (or to instruct
his Treasury Secretary to promulgate) regulations that increase
tax revenue than to promulgate regulations that reduce tax
revenue.  Indeed, the prospect of promulgating regulations that
reduce revenue will be quite attractive to the President: if his
administration acts on its own to reduce taxes, the President
will reap all the political benefits, while he and Congress will
share the political costs of spending cuts.
The rudimentary model yields a partial explanation for pat-
terns of presidential action and inaction in the tax domain, but
the account is incomplete in several respects.  For one, the
model envisions a single decision maker (the President) making
a one-time decision (whether to promulgate regulations or re-
quest legislation).  More realistically, outcomes are the product
of strategic interactions between the executive and legislative
branches across a range of tax law issues.  A game-theoretic
model helps to describe these interactions.  The President de-
cides whether or not to regulate, and Congress decides whether
or not to legislate.  All else equal, the President would prefer to
share the political costs of raising revenue with Congress, while
Congress would prefer that the President bear all the political
costs of raising revenue himself.
The game-theoretic model yields a number of additional
implications.  First, the model suggests that the President may
ask Congress to pass revenue-raising legislative proposals even
when the political costs to the President of implementing the
proposal via regulation are less than his portion of the shared
political benefits from additional spending.  In more colloquial
terms, the President may ask Congress to share the dirty work
of raising revenue even though, push comes to shove, the ad-
ministration would be willing to act on its own.  Second, and
symmetrically, the model suggests that Congress may rebuff
the President’s requests for revenue-raising legislation even
when Congress’s share of the political costs of raising revenue
is less than Congress’s share of the political benefits from the
additional spending that revenue-raising would allow.  In other
words, members of Congress may try to call the President’s
bluff—they may reject the President’s recommendations for
revenue-raising legislation in the hope that if they do not act,
the executive branch will proceed on its own.  In his ideal
world, the President could credibly commit not to implement
certain revenue-raising regulations, thus spurring Congress to
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act.  And in its ideal world, Congress could credibly commit not
to pass certain revenue-raising measures, thus spurring the
President to act on his own.  Absent the possibility of such
credible commitments, however, some revenue-raising mea-
sures that could be implemented via regulation or via legisla-
tion may not be implemented at all.
Part II goes on to discuss further implications of the game-
theoretic model.  First, I consider the role of ideology in bar-
gaining between the President and Congress.  If the political
costs of revenue-raising measures are higher for Republicans
than for Democrats, divided government will affect bargaining
outcomes.  When the President is a Democrat and Congress is
controlled by Republicans, the Democratic President will dis-
count the probability of revenue-raising legislative action; ac-
cordingly, the Democratic President may be more willing to
raise revenue unilaterally.  Meanwhile, when the President is a
Republican and Congress is controlled by Democrats, then the
President will assign a higher value to the probability of reve-
nue-raising legislation, and Congress will discount the
probability of unilateral executive action.  Perhaps a more sur-
prising implication is that a wider divergence between the Pres-
ident’s preferences and Congress’s does not necessarily reduce
the probability of revenue-raising action because Presidents
will be more willing to raise revenue unilaterally when Con-
gress is strongly tax-averse, and Congress will be more willing
to pass revenue-raising legislation when the President is
strongly tax-averse.
Next, I examine the role of doctrine in defining the terms of
interactions between the President and Congress.  Judicial def-
erence to the executive branch’s interpretations of tax statutes
will, intuitively, expand the universe of revenue-raising mea-
sures that the executive branch can implement on its own.
Less intuitively, judicial deference may make Congress more
reluctant to adopt revenue-raising legislation: after all, Con-
gress would prefer not to bear the political costs of revenue-
raising measures if it does not have to.  The latter observation
suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Founda-
tion for Medical Education & Research v. United States, to the
extent that it increased judicial deference to Treasury regula-
tions, may have been a double-edged sword: Mayo Foundation
empowered the executive branch to act unilaterally, but it also
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may have discouraged Congress from raising revenue via
legislation.45
Part II then considers the role of congressional “deficit
hawks” in the tax policymaking process.  I assume that some
members of Congress are reluctant to vote for legislation unless
it is revenue neutral.  (Congress has periodically adopted
“PAYGO” rules that attempt to codify this revenue neutrality
constraint.)  PAYGO has the potential to discourage the execu-
tive branch from adopting a revenue-raising measure on its
own, because by doing so, it loses the ability to include those
revenue raisers in legislation as offsets for the expenditures or
tax cuts that the President supports.46  The irony is that
lawmakers’ emphasis on revenue neutrality may discourage
the executive branch from pursuing regulatory actions that
would raise revenue and reduce the deficit.  The Article thus
draws attention to a potential unintended consequence of
PAYGO rules.
Having previewed the aims of the Article, I should add a
word about what the Article does not aspire to do.  This Article
does not seek to offer a comprehensive account of the regula-
tory or legislative process in tax law.47  Rather, my objective is
to present a tractable model of strategic interactions between
the executive branch and Congress—a model that, I hope,
sheds light on some otherwise puzzling aspects of tax poli-
cymaking.  Like any model, it inevitably oversimplifies.  But
such oversimplification is a necessary aspect of the modeling
enterprise—and perhaps not an entirely unfortunate one.48
45 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
53–57 (2011).
46 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANS-
ACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 127
(1999) (explaining how PAYGO constricts the policy choices available to both the
President and Congress).
47 For one such account, see BERMAN & HANEMAN, supra note 41. R
48 See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 7 (1979)
(“Explanatory power . . . is gained by moving away from ‘reality,’ not by staying
close to it.  A full description would be of least explanatory power. . . .  Departing
from reality is not necessarily good, but unless one can do so in some clever way,
one can only describe and not explain.”).
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I
THE PRESIDENT’S (LARGELY LATENT) POWER TO TAX
A. Presidential Administration Outside of Tax
The President wields broad power to pursue policy objec-
tives via executive action.49  One source of presidential power is
the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, which requires all
principal executive officers of the United States to be appointed
by the President (with the Senate’s advice and consent).50  The
Appointments Clause generally allows the President to choose
agency heads who share his policy preferences (though, to be
sure, this mechanism of presidential control may break down
when Congress repeatedly refuses to confirm the President’s
nominees).  A second source of presidential power arises from
his removal authority: as a general rule, the President may fire
executive officers who disobey his commands.51  The Supreme
Court has recognized an exception to the general rule where
Congress has “conferr[ed] good-cause tenure on the principal
officers of certain independent agencies;” the Federal Trade
Commission is one example.52  However, the President has the
power to fire any Cabinet Secretary at will.  Past Presidents
have exercised this power relatively rarely, but the firing of a
49 The phrase “executive action” does not refer to a “special legal category.”  It
is, as Eric Posner puts it, “more like a layman’s term for anything the executive
branch does.” See Julie Percha, The Nuance You May Have Missed in Obama’s
Gun Control Plan, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/updates/whats-the-difference-between-an-executive-order-and-ac-
tion [https://perma.cc/ZAK5-X7Q4] (quoting Posner).  The term “executive order”
does appear in the U.S. Code: the Federal Register Act requires publication of
most “executive orders” in the Federal Register (though executive orders need not
be published if they lack “general applicability and legal effect” or if they are
effective only against federal officials). See 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2012).  As a prac-
tical matter, though, many presidential pronouncements that are not labeled
“executive order” nonetheless appear in the Federal Register, and many executive
orders appear in the Federal Register even though they technically fall within one
of § 1505(a)’s exceptions.  A recent report from the Congressional Research Ser-
vice observes that “[t]he distinction between these instruments—executive orders,
presidential memoranda, and proclamations—seems to be more a matter of form
than of substance,” given that any such document “may be employed to direct and
govern the actions of government officials and agencies.” VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD
GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20846, EXECUTIVE ORDERS: ISSUANCE, MODIFICA-
TION, AND REVOCATION 2 (2014).  This Article will use the term “executive action”
throughout to refer to actions by the Secretary of the Treasury and other adminis-
tration officials to implement the President’s policies.
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Account-
ing Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
51 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492.
52 Id.; Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935).
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Cabinet Secretary is not an unheard-of occurrence.53  Moreo-
ver, executive branch officials labor in the shadow of the Presi-
dent’s removal power: the President’s authority to fire his
underlings may have a significant effect on their conduct even
if firings are infrequent.
Beyond controlling the identities of agency heads, Presi-
dents also pursue policy objectives by issuing executive orders
and presidential memoranda directing executive branch offi-
cials to take specific actions.54  Often these directives instruct
Cabinet Secretaries or other agency heads to promulgate par-
ticular regulations.  Examples of presidential memoranda from
President Obama’s second term include: a memorandum in-
structing the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Sec-
retary of Homeland Security to conduct and sponsor research
into gun safety technology that will reduce the risk of acciden-
tal discharge or unauthorized use of firearms and that will
improve the tracing of lost and stolen guns;55 a memorandum
requiring that federally employed physicians undergo training
regarding prescription opioid paid medication misuse;56 a
memorandum instructing the Secretary of Education to pro-
pose regulations allowing certain borrowers to cap their federal
student loan payments at 10% of income;57 a memorandum
instructing the Secretary of Labor to propose regulations ex-
panding overtime protections for workers in the private and
public sectors;58 and a memorandum instructing the EPA Ad-
ministrator to issue a final rule setting standards for green-
53 See, e.g., Firing of Presidential Cabinet Members a Rarity, NPR: ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?sto
ryId=251330321 [https://perma.cc/Q9LR-TGE4] (explaining why Presidents only
occasionally fire cabinet members).
54 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2993–99.  On the distinction (or lack thereof) R
between executive orders and presidential memoranda, see supra note 49 (com- R
paring and contrasting the usage of executive orders and memoranda by the
Reagan and Clinton administrations).
55 BARACK OBAMA, DAILY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, DCPD
201600004, MEMORANDUM ON PROMOTING SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 4, 2016).
56 BARACK OBAMA, DAILY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, DCPD
201500743, MEMORANDUM ON ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE AND HEROIN USE
(Oct. 21, 2015).
57 BARACK OBAMA, DAILY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, DCPD
201400440, MEMORANDUM ON HELPING STRUGGLING FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN BORROW-
ERS MANAGE THEIR DEBT (June 9, 2014).
58 BARACK OBAMA, DAILY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, DCPD
201400165, MEMORANDUM ON UPDATING AND MODERNIZING OVERTIME REGULATIONS
(Mar. 13, 2014).
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house gas emissions from power plants.59  While President
Obama issued memoranda to agencies more frequently than
his predecessors, he was not the first chief executive to use
such memoranda as a means of pursuing policy objectives.60
Then-Professor Kagan noted that the Clinton administration
was a turning point in the use of presidential memoranda to
catalyze agency action: by her count, President Reagan issued
nine directives to heads of domestic policy agencies regarding
substantive regulatory policy; the first President Bush issued
four such directives; President Clinton issued 107.61  (Accord-
ing to another tally, the second President Bush issued approxi-
mately 150 during his two terms and President Obama had
almost reached the 200 mark by the end of his first six years in
office.)62
Presidents also exercise power over executive agencies
through a formal process of “presidential review” of proposed
regulations.63  Every President since Reagan has required
agencies to submit all proposed rules to the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs, a part of the Office of Management
and Budget within the White House.64  Agencies also must
submit a “regulatory impact analysis” accompanying any rule
that is “major” or “significant,” with “major” or “significant”
defined to include rules likely to result in an “annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more.”65  That analysis gener-
ally (but not always) involves some quantification of the regula-
tion’s costs and benefits.66  If OIRA determines that a proposed
59 BARACK OBAMA, DAILY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, DCPD
201300457, MEMORANDUM ON POWER SECTOR CARBON POLLUTION STANDARDS (June
25, 2013).
60 See Kenneth S. Lowande, After the Orders: Presidential Memoranda and
Unilateral Action, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 724, 730 fig.1 (2014) (depicting graphi-
cally the number of executive orders and presidential memoranda issued from
1960 to 2012).
61 Kagan, supra note 24, at 2294. R
62 See Gregory Korte, Obama Issues ‘Executive Orders by Another Name,’ USA
TODAY (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/
12/16/obama-presidential-memoranda-executive-orders/20191805 [perma.cc/
5FR2-CYLY]; Presidential Memoranda, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/presidential-memoranda [https://per
ma.cc/8BW3-H78Y].
63 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1767 (2013).
64 See id.
65 See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
66 See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits
and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 89–94
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rule is not cost-justified, OIRA “returns” the rule to the agency
for further consideration.67  Recent Presidents have used the
OIRA review process to block regulations that diverged from
their policy objectives.  In September 2011, President Obama
“requested” that the EPA Administrator withdraw draft rules
setting national ambient air quality standards for ozone.68
(The EPA Administrator, who serves at the President’s plea-
sure, unsurprisingly complied with the request.)69  For its part,
the administration of George W. Bush “returned” 42 rules to
the agency after OIRA review.70
Once a rule passes through the OIRA review process and is
promulgated by an agency, it still may be challenged in the
courts.  Judicial review of agency regulations interpreting stat-
utes is generally governed by the two-step Chevron framework.
Under Chevron, the court first determines “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” in the
relevant statute.71  If yes, then Congress’s unambiguous state-
ment is controlling.  Conversely, “if the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute”—or, phrased differently, whether
the agency arrived at a “reasonable interpretation.”72
The Chevron framework is no doubt familiar to most read-
ers, and I will not pause here to comment on its various excep-
tions and limits.73  The key takeaways from the discussion of
presidential administration outside of tax are as follows: The
President can pursue his policy objectives by appointing loyal
agency heads and removing disloyal ones, by directing agencies
to take specific actions such as promulgating regulations, and
(2016) (noting that regulators oftentimes fail to quantify the costs and benefits of
major rules).
67 Exec. Order 12,866 § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2012).
68 BARACK OBAMA, DAILY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, DCPD
201100607, Statement on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(Sept. 2, 2011).
69 Gabriel Nelson, EPA Reveals Jackson’s Preferred Path on Ozone Rule, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/04/04greenwire-
epa-reveals-jacksons-preferred-path-on-ozone-r-23864.html [https://perma.cc/
8MBG-3XEU].
70 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Mak-
ing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1150 (2010).
71 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
72 Id. at 837, 843–44.
73 For a more comprehensive treatment, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
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by blocking agencies from issuing regulations that diverge from
his agenda.  Moreover, when an executive agency does issue a
regulation interpreting a statute, that regulation is (at least as
a doctrinal matter) generally reviewed under the deferential
Chevron framework.  This is true even when the regulation
reverses the view adopted by a previous administration (or
adopted previously by the same administration).74  To be sure,
the President also can pursue his policy goals by submitting
legislative proposals to Congress and by using his “bully pulpit”
to put pressure on Congress for action.75  And, of course, he
has the power to veto legislation at odds with his own prefer-
ences.  But Presidents can—and do—carry out significant ele-
ments of their agenda on their own, without congressional
participation.
B. Presidential Administration and Tax Law
Formally, the President’s powers with respect to tax law
look very similar to his powers in most other areas.  Both the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue serve at the President’s pleasure: the President ap-
points them (with the advice and consent of Congress) and can
remove them at will.76  The same is true for the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for tax policy and the IRS Chief Counsel,
the officials most directly responsible for drafting regulations
that interpret the Internal Revenue Code.77  The Constitution
74 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 981 (2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the
agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework. . . .  [T]he whole point of
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the
implementing agency.” (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742
(1996))).
75 See generally George C. Edwards III & B. Dan Wood, Who Influences
Whom?  The President, Congress, and the Media, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 327 (2014)
(analyzing the ability of Presidents to use public pressure to spur Congress to
their preferred policies).
76 President George W. Bush’s first Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, techni-
cally “resigned,” but by almost all accounts “was fired.” See Edmund L. Andrews,
Upheaval in the Treasury: The Treasury Secretary; Bush, in Shake-Up of Cabinet,
Ousts Treasury Leader, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/12/07/politics/07ONEI.html [https://perma.cc/DG2D-MEJJ]; John F.
Dickerson, Confessions of a White House Insider, TIME (Jan. 10, 2004), http://
content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,574809,00.html [https://per
ma.cc/CCU4-6DTX].
77 On the role of the Assistant Secretary and the IRS Chief Counsel in the
regulatory process, see IRM 32.1.6.9 (2016). See also 26 U.S.C. § 7803 (2012)
(providing for presidential appointment and removal of the IRS Chief Counsel,
with the IRS Commissioner providing recommendations to the President on both
points).
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also imposes no constraints on Congress’s ability to delegate
authority to the executive branch in tax law beyond the con-
straints that apply in other areas.  (The Origination Clause con-
strains Congress with regard to revenue measures,78 but the
Supreme Court has said that the Origination Clause does not
affect the ability of Congress to delegate authority to the Presi-
dent regarding tax matters.)79  And at least in theory, the Presi-
dent can exercise the same authority with respect to the
Treasury Department and the IRS through memoranda and
return letters as he can with respect to other cabinet agencies
and sub-agencies.
Here, however, theory and practice diverge.  It does not
appear that the President has ever issued a memorandum di-
recting the Treasury or the IRS to take regulatory action on a
tax-specific issue.80  Moreover, none of the OIRA return letters
78 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills.”).  In practice, the Origination Clause rarely im-
poses a binding constraint: “With increasing frequency, the Senate takes a reve-
nue bill passed by the House (the ‘shell bill’), strikes the language of the bill
entirely, and replaces it with its own revenue bill unrelated to the one that began
in the House.”  Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origi-
nation Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659, 661 (2014) (footnote omitted).  So far this
“shell bill” maneuver has passed muster in federal court. See id. at 662 n.10.
79 A unanimous Court addressed this issue in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline
Co.:
We discern nothing in [the structure of Article I] that would distin-
guish Congress’ power to tax from its other enumerated powers—
such as its commerce powers, its power to “raise and support Ar-
mies,” its power to borrow money, or its power to “make Rules for
the Government”—in terms of the scope and degree of discretionary
authority that Congress may delegate to the Executive in order that
the President may “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
It is, of course, true that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue [must] origi-
nate in the House of Representatives.”  But the Origination
Clause . . . implies nothing about the scope of Congress’ power to
delegate discretionary authority under its taxing power once a tax
bill has been properly enacted. . . .  We find no support . . . for [the]
contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Con-
gress require the application of a different and stricter nondelega-
tion doctrine in cases where Congress delegates discretionary
authority to the Executive under its taxing power. . . .  Congress
may wisely choose to be more circumspect in delegating authority
under the Taxing Clause than under other of its enumerated pow-
ers, but this is not a heightened degree of prudence required by the
Constitution.
490 U.S. 212, 220–23 (1989) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7).
80 President Obama has issued one memorandum addressed to the commis-
sioner of internal revenue, although the memo did not direct the commissioner to
take regulatory action.  Rather, the memo responded to reports from the Govern-
ment Accountability Office indicating that tens of thousands of federal contrac-
tors had failed to pay their federal taxes. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
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(or, at least, none of the publicly disclosed return letters) relate
to tax regulations. And a recent study by the Government Ac-
countability Office turned up only two instances in which OIRA
has determined that an IRS regulation has an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more.81
The IRS, for its part, maintains that tax-related regulations
are generally exempt from the requirements of Executive Order
12,866, which sets forth the details of the presidential review
process.82  That exemption claim is questionable.  The Service
says that “[m]ost IRS/Treasury regulations are not significant
regulatory actions for two key reasons.”  The first reason is that
“the economic effect of a regulation under [Executive Order]
12,866 is not determined by the amount of taxes imposed or
collected under the regulation.”  The second is that “most IRS/
Treasury regulations merely implement a statute”; thus, “[t]he
effect from a rule in most IRS/Treasury regulations is almost
always a result of the underlying statute, rather than the regu-
lation itself.”  Neither assertion holds up under scrutiny.
The IRS’s first point seems to rely on the notion that an
agency, in calculating the “annual effect on the economy” of a
proposed regulation, ought not include revenues raised.  To be
sure, if a regulation requires one party to transfer $100 million
to another, the $100 million should not be considered a net
benefit or a net cost for purposes of cost-benefit analysis.83
But OIRA has clearly stated that the “annual effect on the
GAO-07-742T, TAX COMPLIANCE: THOUSANDS OF FEDERAL CONTRACTORS ABUSE THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 1–4 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07742t.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4LFA-557K].  The memo directed the commissioner to “conduct
a review of certifications of non-delinquency in taxes that companies bidding for
Federal contracts are required to submit,” and to “report to [the President] within
90 days on the overall accuracy of the contractors’ certifications.”  Press Release,
White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-and-agencies-1
[https://perma.cc/9M2G-HGLE].
81 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-720, REGULATORY GUIDANCE
PROCESSES: TREASURY AND OMB NEED TO REEVALUATE LONG-STANDING EXEMPTIONS OF
TAX REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE 18–19 (2016).  One of these was a 2011 Treasury
Determination regulating paid preparers, T.D. 9527, 2011-27 I.R.B. 1-30, subse-
quently set aside by a federal court. See Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 69, 81
(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  The other was the proposed
rule on earnings stripping mentioned above. See supra notes 1–2 and accompa- R
nying text.
82 See IRM 32.1.5.4.7.5.3(4) (2015).
83 Cf. Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis,
53 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1069 (2003) (noting that if transfer regulation “pays $100 to
farmers” and “also costs taxpayers $100,” then “the costs and benefits wash out,”
and the only term that would enter into a cost-benefit calculation is the adminis-
trative cost of the transfer).
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economy” calculation “includes benefits, costs, or transfers.”84
Other agencies routinely include transfers when calculating a
regulation’s effect on the economy.  For example, in determin-
ing that a regulation adjusting patent fees qualified as a “signif-
icant” action under Executive Order 12,866, the Patent and
Trademarks Office considered the additional fees that the regu-
lation would generate.85  Likewise, in determining whether a
recent rule on registration fees qualified as “significant,” the
Drug Enforcement Agency calculated the additional fees that
the rule would raise and factored those into its estimate of the
regulation’s annual economic effect.86  The IRS’s interpretation
of “annual effect on the economy” is thus at odds with White
House pronouncements and with the practices of other
agencies.
The IRS’s second argument is even more perplexing.  Most
regulations promulgated by any agency implement a statute—
after all, statutes are the source of agencies’ authority.  The
same rationale would seem to justify exemptions from Execu-
tive Order 12,866 for EPA regulations implementing the Clean
Air Act—the bread and butter of OIRA review.87  And the IRS
cites no source for its claim that regulations implementing stat-
utes are exempt from Executive Order 12,866.88
84 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2011), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/circulars/a004/a-4_FAQ.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/7CV6-J2XL].
85 Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212, 4282 (Jan. 18, 2013)
(codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 41, & 42).
86 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA-346, ECO-
NOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF FINAL RULE ON CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AND LIST I CHEMICAL
REGISTRATION AND REREGISTRATION FEES 18 (2012).
87 But see Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administra-
tive, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 80 Fed. Reg. 38,516
(July 6, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541) (regulatory impact analysis
pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 for proposed rule interpreting FLSA); Eco-
nomic and Cost Analysis for Air Pollution Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa
.gov/economic-and-cost-analysis-air-pollution-regulations [https://perma.cc/
UMT9-2M2T] (last updated Sept. 23, 2016) (compiling RIAs for EPA regulations
implementing the Clean Air Act).
88 The IRS’s exemption claim is particularly perplexing because Executive
Order 12,866 does not exempt regulations with an annual effect on the economy
of less than $100 million from the cost-benefit analysis requirement; rather, regu-
lations that fall below the $100 million threshold (and that do not otherwise
qualify as “significant”) are exempt from the requirement of OIRA review.  A recent
comment from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in a tax-related rulemaking em-
phasizes this point. See Comment from U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Supple-
mental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Minimum Value of Eligible Employer-
Sponsored Health Plans (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/files/uscc_minimum_value_supp_nprm.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/QH6A-U9NT].
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Indeed, a 1983 memorandum of agreement between the
Treasury and OMB, recently released under the Freedom of
Information Act, would seem to suggest that “major” or “signifi-
cant” IRS regulatory actions are indeed subject to OIRA review.
The memorandum exempts from OIRA review all revenue rul-
ings and non-“major” regulations, with the negative implication
that “major” regulations enjoy no such exemption.89  OIRA Ad-
ministrator Howard Shelanski further confirmed in testimony
before a Senate subcommittee in September 2016 that “the IRS
is in fact not exempt from OIRA review.”90
In any event, the IRS’s exemption claim cannot be chal-
lenged in court.  Executive Order 12,866, by its own terms, “is
intended only to improve the internal management of the fed-
eral government and does not create any right or benefit, sub-
stantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party
against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its
officers or employees, or any other person.”91  In other words,
only the President can enforce the order.  Successive Presi-
dents have declined to demand that the IRS submit its signifi-
cant regulations for White House review.92  So while the
President’s formal power with respect to the IRS is no different
than with respect to other parts of the executive branch, past
Presidents have not sought to exercise this power (or, at least,
have not sought to exercise this power through presidential
review of tax regulations).
C. Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations
While Executive Order 12,866 is not judicially enforceable,
the Treasury’s tax regulations are judicially reviewable.  And
until recently, judicial review of tax regulations offered another
89 Memorandum of Agreement: Treasury and OMB Implementation of Execu-
tive Order 12991, WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF INFO. & REG. AFFS. (Apr. 29, 1983), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/memos/2016/omb_moa_
83_93.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD2B-F3H8].
90 Alison Bennett, New Tax Rule Challenges May Follow Memorandum Re-
lease, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.bna.com/
new-tax-rule-n57982077591 [https://perma.cc/7KES-E6VR].
91 Exec. Order 12,866, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2012).
92 The IRS’s noncompliance with Executive Order 12,866 thus offers another
example of “tax exceptionalism.”  On tax exceptionalism, see generally Kristin E.
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (articulating the case against tax exceptionalism in
judicial deference); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?,
63 DUKE L.J. 1897 (2014) (observing that in tax, as in other areas of law, subject
matter-specific rules and norms are widespread, though arguably more so in tax
than elsewhere).
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example of tax exceptionalism.  As noted above, the Supreme
Court set forth a two-step framework for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations in the Chevron case, decided
in 1984.  Five years earlier, though, in National Muffler Dealers
Ass’n v. United States,93 the Court set out a somewhat different
test for judicial review of IRS interpretations of the tax code.
National Muffler laid out a multifactor test for determining
whether an interpretation of a tax statute in a Treasury regula-
tion would pass judicial muster.  The first factor was whether
the regulation “is a substantially contemporaneous construc-
tion of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of
congressional intent,” or whether “the regulation dates from a
later period.”94  (Regulations issued immediately after the stat-
ute was passed would carry greater force.)  Other factors in-
cluded “the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the
reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s
interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has de-
voted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the
statute.”  For decades, the Supreme Court oscillated between
citing National Muffler and Chevron without any acknowledge-
ment of the gap between the two.95  The Tax Court, for its part,
also went back and forth: in the 1985-2010 period, it cited
Chevron but not National Muffler in forty-eight cases; cited Na-
tional Muffler but not Chevron in fifty-four cases; and cited both
Chevron and National Muffler in twenty-seven cases.96
Finally, in 2011, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve
the confusion.  In Mayo Foundation, the Court unanimously
rejected National Muffler and announced that Chevron would
apply to tax.  As Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court,
“[t]he principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with
full force in the tax context.”97 Mayo Foundation laid to rest
93 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
94 Id. at 477.
95 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
53–55 (2011) (collecting cases).
96 These numbers are drawn from searches of the LexisNexis database and
restricting results to U.S. Tax Court cases.  A search for citations to Chevron turns
up seventy-five citing cases for the period from January 1, 1985, to December 31,
2010.  A search for citations to National Muffler with the same restrictions turns
up eighty-one citing cases.  Twenty-seven Tax Court cases in that period cite both
Chevron and National Muffler.
97 Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55.  Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), has injected additional uncertainty into
the tax deference debate. See Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended
Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 71 (suggesting that the
Chief Justice’s opinion in Burwell “may now have inadvertently opened the door to
a new, de facto version of tax exceptionalism in judicial review of tax cases”).
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any notion that Treasury and IRS interpretations of tax stat-
utes might deserve less deference than agency interpretations
in other contexts.
To be sure, Chevron deference does not mean that the IRS
will win every statutory interpretation case.  Recent IRS losses
in the Federal Circuit and the Tax Court make that much
clear.98  Moreover, win rates are a flawed measure of success
because of selection at the filing and settlement stages.99  What
we do know is that in court of appeals cases between 2003 and
2013 in which the court has applied Chevron, the IRS’s win
rate is approximately 83%—higher than the overall average
across agencies for Chevron cases.100 This would seem to sug-
gest that judicial review of tax regulations under Chevron is
deferential both in theory and in fact.
D. Executive Action or Legislation
Unilateral executive action is, of course, not the only way
that Presidents can pursue their policy objectives.101  A Presi-
dent also can submit a legislative proposal to Congress and can
then use his bully pulpit to put pressure on Congress to pass
the proposal.  One advantage of the legislative route is that
statutes are more durable than regulations and executive or-
ders: a future administration with a different set of policy pref-
erences can rescind a rule or order, but it cannot repeal a
statute without the support of majorities in the House and
98 See Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 3 (2015).  The IRS’s appeal from the
Altera decision is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit. See Altera Corp. v.
Comm’r, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir. appeal filed Feb. 9, 2016).
99 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial: An Empirical Study of
Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 318–19 (1999).
100 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 51 tbl.3), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2808848 [https://perma.cc/JZ83-3B57].
101 Moreover, regulations are not the only way that Presidents can pursue
policy objectives through executive action.  On sub-regulatory mechanisms
outside tax, see generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the
Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).  On sub-regulatory mechanisms in tax law, see
generally BERMAN & HANEMAN, supra note 41, at 192.  On presidential control over R
sub-regulatory mechanisms, see Nou, supra note 63 at 1757–59.  This Article R
analyzes the choice between executive action and legislation without focusing on
the varieties of executive action.  The question of when—and why—the Treasury
and the IRS use regulations as opposed to revenue rulings, general counsel mem-
oranda, and other documents is a significant but separate question.
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Senate.102  And where the relevant statutes limit the Presi-
dent’s latitude to pursue policy objectives via executive action,
the legislative route may be the only one available.
Nonetheless, recent Presidents have used regulations and
other executive actions to pursue policy objectives on many
occasions, often testing the limits of executive authority.  As
noted above, the Obama administration pursued major policies
regarding guns, health, the environment, labor, and immigra-
tion via regulatory action.  Examples from the administration of
George W. Bush, in addition to those mentioned in the intro-
duction, include an FDA rule compelling food manufacturers to
label products for trans-fat content103 and an EPA rule setting
stricter limits on particle pollution104—both of which followed
from OIRA “prompt” letters instructing the relevant agency to
act.105  Examples from the Clinton years are even more numer-
ous: from extending Medicare to cover clinical trials, to bolster-
ing regulations for the testing and labeling of children’s
prescription drugs, to imposing new safety standards for im-
ported foods.106  This list is far from exhaustive.
Tax policymaking, though, follows a different pattern.  As
noted above, the President submits a set of tax proposals to
Congress each year along with his budget.  And each year,
Congress fails to act on many (generally, most) of the proposals
in the President’s Greenbook.  Yet only occasionally do the
President and his Treasury Department then pursue Green-
book goals via regulation.  This is so even though, as detailed in
the next section, many failed Greenbook proposals could be
carried out through executive action.
102 On the benefits to interest groups of durable laws, see generally Saul
Levmore, Interest Groups and the Durability of Law, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING
(Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., forthcoming Mar. 2017).
103 See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Eco-
nomics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 461–62 (2008).
104 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed.
Reg. 61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
105 See Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Af-
fairs, to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 18, 2001),
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs_prompt_letter.html [https://perma
.cc/WD3E-SFLS]; Letter from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to Christine Todd Whitman, Adm’r, EPA (Dec. 4, 2001), http://www
.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/epa_pm_research_prompt120401.html [https://per
ma.cc/Q3JU-ZQET].
106 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 2295, 2304–05. R
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E. The President’s Greenbook and the Regulatory Road
Not Taken
In February 2016, President Obama submitted his eighth
and final Greenbook to Congress.  As with every other Green-
book produced by the Obama administration, this one included
a number of proposals that the President—through the Trea-
sury and the IRS—likely could have implemented on his own.
This section provides a partial list of those proposals, several of
which also appeared in Clinton administration Greenbooks.107
To be sure, if the President and Treasury sought to enact these
measures via regulation, taxpayers might have challenged
those regulatory actions in court.  But in other areas of law,
President Obama—like his predecessors—proved more than
willing to act unilaterally even in the face of certain court chal-
lenges (and uncertain results).
The following summaries are written for readers with only a
basic understanding of tax law.  Scholars and practitioners pri-
marily focused on tax will find that some nuances are ad-
dressed in only broad brushstrokes.  The goal of this section is
to offer an introduction to the sorts of proposals that presiden-
tial administrations could carry out on their own but instead
include in their Greenbooks.  It does not provide a comprehen-
sive treatment of any one such proposal.
1. Taxing Carried Interests as Ordinary Income
A partnership profits interest—colloquially known as a
“carried interest”—is the right to receive a percentage of a part-
nership’s future profits.  Unlike a capital interest, a profits in-
terest does not entail a right to receive money or other property
in the event that the partnership is liquidated.108  The typical
private equity fund, hedge fund, and venture capital fund is
organized as a partnership, with the managers as general part-
ners.  The standard formula for determining the managers’
107 Victor Fleischer has generated a separate list of tax law reforms that the
Treasury could accomplish via regulatory action. See Victor Fleischer, 8 Tax
Loopholes the Obama Administration Could Close, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 18,
2015, 12:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/8-tax-loopholes-
the-obama-administration-could-close [https://perma.cc/GJX4-7Y2Q].  My list
differs from Fleischer’s insofar as the proposals listed here are all proposals that
the President has already endorsed in the Greenbook.  Fleischer identifies mea-
sures that are “consistent with President Obama’s renewed interest in business
tax policy,” rather than measures that the President is already on the record as
supporting. Id.
108 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-2-09, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL—PART
ONE: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROVISIONS 110–11 (2009).
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compensation is known as “two and twenty”: the manager re-
ceives an annual fee equal to 2% of the fund’s total assets plus
20% of any profits.  The 2% management fee is taxable as ordi-
nary income. By contrast, managers generally pay no income
tax when they receive the profits interest at the time the fund is
formed; instead, profits are taxed as investment income when
they are realized.  If profits take the form of dividends or long-
term capital gains, then managers are taxed at a top statutory
rate of 20% instead of the 39.6% top statutory rate on ordinary
income.109
The current state of affairs is largely the consequence of a
revenue procedure issued by the IRS in the first year of the
Clinton administration.110  It is not an inevitable result of the
existing statutory scheme.  Section 707 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which dates back to 1954, empowers the Treasury Secre-
tary to promulgate regulations addressing circumstances in
which “a partner performs services for a partnership.”111  The
statute authorizes the Treasury Secretary to treat those trans-
actions as if they “occurr[ed] between the partnership and one
who is not a partner.”112  That provision would at least argua-
bly allow the Secretary to characterize allocations to the man-
ager of an investment partnership such as a private equity,
venture capital, or hedge fund as ordinary income—without
any further action by Congress.  (Indeed, one prominent tax
law scholar has written a model regulation with specific lan-
guage that the Treasury Secretary could copy.113)
109 See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits
in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008) (explaining the typical compen-
sation structure for fund managers).  For many hedge fund managers, a signifi-
cant share of carried interest income comes from short-term capital gains, in
which case hedge fund managers face the same statutory rates as for ordinary
income.  For this reason, private equity and venture capital fund managers, not
hedge fund managers, appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the carried inter-
est status quo. See Victor Fleischer, Why Hedge Funds Don’t Worry About Carried
Interest Tax Rules, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 14, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/why-hedge-funds-dont-worry-about-car-
ried-interest-tax-rules [https://perma.cc/R5GY-EHUE]. Note that the 20% and
39.6% figures do not account for other features of the tax laws that effectively
raise the rate paid: in particular, the Pease provision (which adds approximately
1.2 percentage points to the capital gains, dividend, and ordinary income rates for
most high-income earners), and the surtaxes imposed by the Affordable Care Act.
See Kyle Pomerleau, The Pease Limitation on Itemized Deductions Is Really a
Surtax, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/pease-limita-
tion-itemized-deductions-really-surtax [https://perma.cc/M8R8-YHGM].
110 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
111 I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
112 § 707(a)(1).
113 Fleischer, supra note 42.  In addition, Steven Rosenthal, a former tax part- R
ner at the law firm of Ropes & Gray and now a senior fellow at the Urban-
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Yet instead of using the Treasury’s existing authority
under section 707, President Obama asked Congress in his
first Greenbook to pass legislation that would lead to ordinary
income treatment for carried interest profits.114  President
Obama included similar proposals in each of his seven Green-
books since then.115  This could not be because Obama admin-
istration officials were unaware of the argument that they
already have authority under section 707 to carry out carried
interest reform: writers in mainstream media outlets have
noted the President’s power to change the tax treatment of
carried interests via regulation.116  And whatever the (non-po-
litical) costs of drafting regulations under section 707, those
costs pale in comparison to the revenues that such a change
would generate.  The most recent Greenbook estimates that
taxing carried interests as ordinary income would raise an ad-
ditional $19.3 billion over the next decade.117  Others have
estimated that the revenues would be an order of magnitude
greater: Victor Fleischer calculates that a change in the tax
treatment of carried interests would raise roughly $180 billion
over a decade.118
Brookings Tax Policy Center, has suggested that the Treasury Department could
reform the taxation of carried interest profits for private equity fund managers by
promulgating regulations that clarify that the income of a private equity fund is
income from a “trade or business” for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code—
and thus ineligible for capital gains treatment. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Private
Equity Is a Business: Sun Capital and Beyond, 140 TAX NOTES 1459, 1467–70
(2013).
114 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 23. R
115 See supra note 35. R
116 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, How Obama Can Increase Taxes on Carried
Interest, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 12, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes
.com/2014/06/12/how-the-president-can-increase-taxes-on-carried-interest
[https://perma.cc/2QH6-9NE6] (claiming the President “could change the tax
treatment of carried interest with a phone call to the Treasury Department”);
David Lebedoff, Why Doesn’t Obama End the Hedge Fund Tax Break?, SLATE (June
2, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/06/taxa-
tion_of_carried_interest_the_loophole_for_hedge_fund_managers_could.html
[https://perma.cc/CSD6-SQ44] (claiming the President “could disable one of the
most powerful sources of wealth and income inequality in our country”).  Senator
Bernie Sanders also has called on the Obama administration to address the
carried interest issue through regulatory action. See Letter from Senator Bernie
Sanders to President Barack Obama (Feb. 27, 2015), https://web.archive.org/
web/20150416084657/http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/
_cache/files/7a8dbc99-3850-4760-be3a-2361c1ec4208/sanders-letter-to-white-
house-on-tax-loopholes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RWF-XR3W].
117 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 269 tbl.1. R
118 Victor Fleischer, An Income Tax on Carried Interest Couldn’t Be Avoided,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/
business/dealbook/an-income-tax-on-carried-interest-couldnt-be-avoided.html
[https://perma.cc/2QH6-9NE6].
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To be sure, Treasury regulations ending the preferential
treatment of carried interest would face court challenges (al-
though as noted above, the specter of litigation did not prevent
President Obama or his administration from taking unilateral
action in other areas119).  Elsewhere, I have suggested that
well-written regulations on carried interest would have a rea-
sonable likelihood of surviving judicial review, but it is far from
a certainty.120  Moreover, the analysis here does not suggest
that the President ought to alter the tax treatment of carried
interests through executive action: as David Weisbach has ar-
gued, “[t]here are sound reasons, many deeply embedded in
partnership tax law, for retaining [the status quo].”121  At least
for the purposes of this Article, I remain agnostic on the norma-
tive question.  President Obama, however, is not agnostic: he
and his administration staked out a position that carried inter-
est profits ought to be taxed as ordinary income.122  The puzzle
is why President Obama, notwithstanding his expressed view,
declined to implement his preferred policy through executive
action.123  And as discussed in the remainder of this section,
the puzzle is in no way unique to carried interest.
2. Restricting the Use of Structures that Generate
Stateless Income
The check-the-box rules allow certain “eligible entities” to
choose whether to be taxed as corporations or as partnerships
(or, in the case of entities with a single owner, to be “disre-
119 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. R
120 Daniel Hemel, Two-and-Twenty and Fifty-Fifty, MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE
DERIVED (May 12, 2016), http://bit.ly/29BUEtp [https://perma.cc/5FH5-FNBT].
121 David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94
VA. L. REV. 715, 764 (2008).
122 See Fleischer, supra note 118. R
123 After a New York Times columnist suggested that the Obama administra-
tion could “close the so-called carried interest loophole” via regulation, a Treasury
spokesperson told a reporter for the publication Tax Notes that “it’s the depart-
ment’s position that ‘only Congress can fully close the carried interest loophole.’”
Amy S. Elliott, IRS Official Addresses Carried Interest Speculation, 151 TAX NOTES
857, 857 (2016); Gretchen Morgenson, Ending Tax Break for Ultrawealthy May
Not Take Act of Congress, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/05/08/business/ending-tax-break-for-ultrawealthy-may-not-take-act-of-
congress.html [https://perma.cc/8QXT-WXJ9]. Democratic presidential candi-
date Hillary Clinton subsequently told a reporter that if she is elected, and if
Congress does not pass carried interest reform on its own, she will direct her
Treasury Department to take regulatory action on carried interest. See Heidi M.
Przybyla, USA Today Interview: Clinton Says She’ll Call Trump Unfit to Handle
Economy, USA TODAY (June 16, 2016, 12:30 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2016/06/15/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-econ-
omy/85928334 [https://perma.cc/5ERY-UV7S].
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garded” and treated as though part of the owner).  The check-
the-box regime has facilitated the phenomenon of “stateless
income,” a term used to describe business income of a multina-
tional group that is not taxed in the country where the group’s
customers reside, nor in the country where the group’s factors
of production are located, nor in the country where the group’s
parent company is domiciled.124  One method of generating
stateless income that has attracted significant attention from
the media and from members of Congress in recent years is the
“Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”125—a technique that Apple,
Google (now “Alphabet”126), and many other high-tech compa-
nies have employed.127
The basic structure of the sandwich is as follows: ABC Inc.,
a U.S. corporation with a popular mobile app, incorporates a
holding company in Ireland (the top piece of bread) and puts
cash inside the holding company.  The Irish holding company
then acquires ABC’s intangible rights to its app for Europe.
Although the holding company is incorporated in Ireland, it is
headquartered in Bermuda and recognized as a Bermuda resi-
dent for purposes of Irish tax law.  The holding company elects
to be treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes pursuant to
the check-the-box regime.
Next, the holding company licenses its regional rights to a
Dutch subsidiary (the middle layer of the sandwich), which
then licenses those rights to a lower-tier Irish subsidiary (the
bottom piece of bread).  Both the Dutch subsidiary and the
Irish subsidiary are treated as corporations under local law but
“check the box” to be treated as disregarded entities under U.S.
law.  The Irish subsidiary then earns royalties from European
users of the app.
The arrangement yields favorable tax consequences for
ABC.  The lower-tier Irish subsidiary has virtually no net in-
124 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 701
(2011).
125 See id. at 706–13.
126 See Conor Dougherty, Google to Reorganize as Alphabet to Keep Its Lead as
an Innovator, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/
technology/google-alphabet-restructuring.html [https://perma.cc/4LF6-NWK2].
127 See Kleinbard, supra note 124, at 707–08; Charles Duhigg & David R
Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-
low-tax-states-and-nations.html [https://perma.cc/B49S-VRQM].  On Google’s
continued use of the “Double Irish” structure, see Toby Sterling & Tom Bergin,
Google Accounts Show 11 Billion Euros Moved via Low Tax ‘Dutch Sandwich’ in
2014, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-tax-
idUSKCN0VS1GP [https://perma.cc/A7WV-S4ZF].
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come taxable in Ireland: its revenues from European customers
are almost entirely offset by its royalty payments to the Dutch
subsidiary.  The Dutch subsidiary, in turn, has virtually no net
income taxable in the Netherlands: its royalty payments from
the lower-tier Irish subsidiary are almost entirely offset by its
payments back to the Irish holding company.  And the Irish
holding company’s income is not taxable under Irish law be-
cause Ireland considers the company to be a resident of Ber-
muda.  Bermuda, for its part, imposes no corporate tax.  And
from the U.S. Treasury’s perspective, the Irish holding com-
pany’s income is the income of a foreign corporation, which is
not taxable in the United States until ABC repatriates the
earnings.128
The sandwich arrangement is facilitated by the Treasury’s
decision to allow ABC to treat the Dutch subsidiary as a disre-
garded entity under check-the-box.  If the Dutch subsidiary
were considered a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, then the
royalty payment from the Dutch subsidiary to the Irish holding
company could be taxable immediately in the United States.
That is because under Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code,
royalties earned by a foreign corporation that ABC owns (a
“controlled foreign corporation,” or CFC) are included in ABC’s
income for U.S. tax purposes if the royalties originate in a
country other than the country in which the foreign corpora-
tion is organized.129  So under Subpart F, royalties paid by a
Dutch corporation to an Irish corporation controlled by ABC
are part of ABC’s taxable income, regardless of when ABC repa-
triates the income.  ABC can get out from under Subpart F
because the Dutch subsidiary and the Irish holding company
are considered the same entity under check-the-box.130
As discussed in more detail below, the check-the-box rules
are creatures of regulation,131 and so presumably could be
amended by regulation as well.132  Indeed, shortly after
128 See Kleinbard, supra note 124, at 706–13. R
129 I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(1)(A), (3)(A) (2012).
130 The Dutch corporation is necessary because Ireland imposes a withholding
tax on royalties paid by an Irish corporation to a Bermuda company.  Since
Ireland considers the lower-tier Irish subsidiary to be an Irish corporation and
considers the holding company to be a Bermuda entity, Ireland would impose a
withholding tax if not for the Dutch layer of the sandwich. See Kleinbard, supra
note 124, at 713. R
131 See infra subpart I.I.
132 There is an important exception to this claim: If the royalties earned by the
lower-level Irish subsidiary are “derived in the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness” and received from an unrelated person, then the royalty income would not
be Subpart F income.  I.R.C. § 954(c)(2)(A).  And under the “look-thru” rule, royal-
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promulgating the check-the-box rules, the Treasury Depart-
ment under President Clinton published Notice 98-11 in Feb-
ruary 1998 announcing its intention to issue regulations
addressing the use of “hybrid branch” arrangements similar to
the Double Irish Dutch.133  (The Dutch layer of the sandwich is
a “hybrid branch” because it is considered a corporation under
Dutch and Irish law but a branch of its Irish parent under the
U.S. check-the-box regime.)  Two months later, the Treasury
published proposed and temporary regulations under which
payments from a hybrid branch to a CFC would give rise to
Subpart F income (i.e., income immediately taxable by the
United States) when certain conditions are present: specifi-
cally, the payment by the hybrid branch reduces the foreign tax
of the payor; the payment consists of dividends, interest, royal-
ties, or rents that would have qualified as Subpart F income if
the payment had been made by one corporation to another;
and the effective tax rate of the payee is significantly lower than
that of the payor.134  (The last condition would be satisfied in
the Double Irish Dutch example if Bermuda’s corporate income
ties received by higher-level subsidiaries would not constitute Subpart F income
to the extent attributable to the non-Subpart F income of the lower-level Irish
subsidiary.  § 954(c)(6).
Yet as important as this exception is, there are three reasons to believe that
the Treasury still has the ability to restrict hybrid branch arrangements like the
Double Irish Dutch in significant ways.  First, while the “active conduct of a trade
or business” rule in § 954(c)(2) is statutory, the term “active conduct of a trade or
business” is not self-defining.  The Treasury can (and to some extent has) defined
the term so as to exclude subsidiaries whose activities are insubstantial in com-
parison to the royalties they receive. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2T (as amended by
I.R.B. 2015-41).
Second, the “look-thru” rule of § 954(c)(6)—while statutory—is also tempo-
rary.  Originally added in 2006 and set to expire at the end of 2008, it has since
been extended five times, and is now scheduled to lapse at the end of 2019. See
I.R.C. § 954 (LEXIS 2016).  This means that check-the-box reform today would
indeed limit the ability of U.S. multinationals to avoid Subpart F tax through the
use of hybrid branches—but the effects would only be felt starting in 2020.
Third, the successive extensions of the look-thru rule are politically more
palatable because of the check-the-box regulations in the background.  Each
extension has a limited effect on the budget—according to the Joint Committee on
Taxation’s (JCT) calculations—because JCT takes for granted the continuity of
the current check-the-box regime.  Thus, JCT scored the most recent five-year
extension of the look-thru rule as reducing revenues by $7.8 billion. JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, JCX-143-15, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF DIVISION Q OF AMENDMENT
#2 TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2029 (RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 114-40), THE
“PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM TAX HIKES ACT OF 2015” 2 (2015).  That figure would
be much larger if U.S. multinationals did not already have the ability to avoid
Subpart F through hybrid branch arrangements like the Double Irish Dutch.
133 I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433.
134 See T.D. 8767, 1998-1 C.B. 875.
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tax rate is less than ninety percent of, and at least five percent-
age points lower than, that of the Netherlands.)135
Notice 98-11 was not long lived.  In May 1998, the Senate
passed a bill that would have imposed a six-month moratorium
on any final rule with respect to Notice 98-11, and that ex-
pressed “the sense of the Senate” that the Treasury should
withdraw the notice.136  Less than two months later, the Trea-
sury withdrew the notice as well as the proposed and tempo-
rary regulations addressing hybrid branches.137  The
withdrawal notice never suggested that the Treasury lacked the
authority to act under existing law.  Rather, it stated: “The
purpose of this action is to allow Congress an appropriate pe-
riod to review the important policy issues raised by the regula-
tions, including the continuing applicability of the policy
rationale of Subpart F, and, if appropriate, address these is-
sues by legislation.”138
Nearly two decades have passed since Notice 98-11, and
Congress still has yet to pass legislation addressing the Double
Irish Dutch.  Yet the Obama administration, rather than reviv-
ing Notice 98-11, continued to ask Congress for a bill to restrict
the use of the sandwich structure and similar mechanisms
that generate stateless income.139  The most recent Greenbook
estimates that such legislation would raise $2.5 billion over the
next decade.140
135 It is.  Bermuda imposes no corporate income tax, while the top corporate
income tax rate in the Netherlands is 25%. See Brian O’Keefe & Marty Jones,
How Uber Plays the Tax Shell Game, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 2015), http://fortune
.com/2015/10/22/uber-tax-shell [https://perma.cc/TX6P-D648].
136 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, H.R.
2676, 105th Cong. § 3713 (as passed by Senate, May 7, 1998).
137 I.R.S. Notice 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 34 (July 6, 1998).
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 36 (Obama administration R
proposal to restrict the use of hybrid arrangements that create stateless income).
Ireland has announced changes to its tax laws that would prevent multinational
firms from using the “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” structure described
above.  Existing arrangements such as Alphabet’s would be exempt from the new
rules until 2020 under a grandfather clause.  Moreover, multinational firms could
replicate the arrangement under the new laws by replacing the Bermuda company
with a company headquartered in Malta or the United Arab Emirates, thus keep-
ing all the key ingredients of the sandwich structure in place. See Jeffrey L.
Rubinger & Summer Ayers Lepree, Death of the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”?
Not So Fast, TAXES WITHOUT BORDERS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.taxeswithout-
bordersblog.com/2014/10/death-of-the-double-irish-dutch-sandwich-not-so-
fast [https://perma.cc/PXQ8-AFL9].
140 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 265 tbl.1. R
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3. Limiting Foreign Tax Credits Claimed by Dual-
Capacity Taxpayers
Section 901 of the Code allows U.S. taxpayers to claim a
credit for income taxes paid to a foreign country.141  Section
903 extends the credit to taxes “paid in lieu of a tax on in-
come.”142  Questions often arise with respect to payments
made by oil and gas companies to foreign governments in ex-
change for specific benefits such as the right to drill for oil on
government land.  If such payments are creditable, they can
reduce the companies’ U.S. tax bill dollar-for-dollar.  If those
payments are merely deductible business expenses, though,
they reduce the companies’ U.S. tax bill by approximately 35
cents on the dollar (a $1 deduction from taxable income multi-
plied by a 35% corporate tax rate).143
In regulations promulgated in 1983, the Treasury Depart-
ment addressed the application of the foreign tax credit provi-
sions to so-called “dual capacity taxpayers”— taxpayers who
are “subject to a levy of a foreign state” and who also receive “a
specific economic benefit from the state.”144  The regulations
spell out a facts-and-circumstances test for determining
whether a foreign levy qualifies as a creditable tax or as a
deductible expense.145  The regulations also establish a safe
harbor for dual capacity taxpayers who want to claim a foreign
tax credit without going through the trouble of proving that the
levy qualifies as a tax under the facts-and-circumstances
test.146  The safe harbor allows the taxpayer to compute the
creditable tax based on the general tax rate in the foreign coun-
try, or—if the foreign country does not impose a general tax—
based on the applicable U.S. federal tax rate.147
In the Greenbook for fiscal year 1998, the Clinton adminis-
tration proposed a change to the dual capacity rules: under the
Clinton proposal, dual capacity taxpayers would not be able to
claim a credit for payments to a foreign government if the for-
eign country has no general tax.148  The Clinton administration
141 I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) (2012).
142 I.R.C. § 903 (2012).
143 See, e.g., John P. Steines, Jr., The Foreign Tax Credit at Ninety-Five Bionic
Centenarian, 66 TAX L. REV. 545, 554 (2013) (describing the mechanics of the
foreign tax credit).
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(ii) (2012).
145 See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2A(b)-(c) (2016).
146 See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2A(c)(3),(e) (2016).
147 See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2A(e) (2016).
148 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
REVENUE PROPOSALS 74 (1997) [hereinafter FY 1998 Greenbook].
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repeated the proposal in its Greenbook for fiscal years 1999,
2000, and 2001.149  The Obama administration included simi-
lar proposals in the Greenbooks for fiscal years 2010 through
2017.150  The Treasury’s most recent estimate is that the pro-
posal, if implemented, would raise revenues by more than $9.6
billion over the next decade.151
While both President Clinton and President Obama asked
Congress to amend the rules for dual capacity taxpayers, it
seems that the Treasury Department could adopt this proposal
unilaterally if it chose.  No statute unambiguously allows a
dual capacity taxpayer to claim a credit for payments made to a
foreign country with no general tax.  If anything, section 903
suggests that such payments should not be creditable: if there
is no general tax, then the payment is not made “in lieu of a tax
on income . . . generally imposed by [the] foreign country.”152
The safe harbor that the last two Democratic Presidents sought
to eliminate is a safe harbor created by regulations that the
Treasury could rescind.  Nonetheless, the Clinton and Obama
administrations declined to act on their own, even though their
statutory authority to do so seems to be quite clear.
4. Repealing the Lower-of-Cost-or-Market Inventory
Accounting Method
Taxpayers that sell goods as part of an active trade or busi-
ness can claim a deduction for the cost of goods sold that tax
year.  Rather than tracking inventory on an item-by-item basis,
taxpayers can determine the cost of goods sold by adding the
value of their inventory at the start of the year to the value of
purchases made during the year and subtracting the value of
their end-of-year inventory.153  Congress has delegated author-
ity to the Treasury Secretary to prescribe methods for inventory
accounting.  The relevant statute, section 471, reads:
149 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-2-00, DESCRIPTION OF REVE-
NUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET PROPOSAL
539 (2000) (discussing proposal’s history).
150 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 39–40; FY 2011 Greenbook, R
supra note 35, at 49–50; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 49–50; FY 2013 R
Greenbook, supra note 35, at 94–95; FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 35, at R
55–56; FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 51–52; FY 2016 Greenbook, supra R
note 35, at 26–27; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 16–17. R
151 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 265 tbl.1. R
152 See I.R.C. § 903 (2012).
153 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-2-12, DESCRIPTION OF REVE-
NUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL
521 (2012).
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Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of invento-
ries is necessary in order clearly to determine the income of
any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on
such basis as the Secretary may prescribe as conforming as
nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the trade
or business and as most clearly reflecting the income.154
One of the approaches allowed by the Treasury is the
“lower-of-cost-or-market” (LCM) method.155  Under the LCM
method, a taxpayer values inventory at the end of the year by
taking the lower of (1) the cost of goods and (2) the market
value.  LCM thus allows taxpayers to take a write-down when
the market value of inventory goods has declined.  This means
that taxpayers can recognize losses even before goods are sold
or exchanged—in marked contrast to the general tax law prin-
ciple of realization.156
No statute specifically authorizes taxpayers to use LCM.
The ability of taxpayers to use LCM arises due to Treasury
regulations, and section 471 gives broad discretion to the Trea-
sury Secretary.  Nonetheless, both President Clinton and Presi-
dent Obama asked Congress to repeal LCM, rather than
amending the inventory regulations on their own.157  Proposals
to repeal LCM have appeared in the Greenbooks for fiscal years
1997 through 2001 and every year in which President Obama
was in office.158  The Treasury Department now estimates that
repealing LCM would raise revenue by approximately $6.8 bil-
lion over the next decade.159
154 I.R.C. § 471(a) (2012).
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(c) (2016).
156 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 153, at 521–22. R
157 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 153, at 521–22; FY R
1998 Greenbook, supra note 148, at 77. R
158 See FY 1998 Greenbook, supra note 148, at 77; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, R
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS 106 (1998)
[hereinafter FY 1999 Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANA-
TIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS 148–49 (1999) [hereinafter FY
2000 Greenbook]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 161–62 (2000) [hereinafter FY
2001 Greenbook]; FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 118; FY 2011 Green- R
book, supra note 35, at 96; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 64; FY 2013 R
Greenbook, supra note 35, at 131; FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 89; FY R
2015 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 94; FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 35, at R
110; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 106. R
159 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 267 tbl.1. R
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5. Modifying the Gift Tax Rules for Grantor Retained
Annuity Trusts
Section 2702 governs the gift tax treatment of transfers of
interests in trusts among family members.  As a general rule,
when one family member (e.g., a mother) sets up a trust for the
benefit of another family member (e.g., her son) but retains an
interest in the trust herself, the value of the retained interest is
treated as zero for gift tax purposes.160  Section 2702 also cre-
ates an exception to the general rule: if the interest retained by
the mother is a “qualified interest,” then the value of the
mother’s interest “shall be determined under section 7520.”161
A “qualified interest” includes “any interest which consists of
the right to receive fixed amounts payable not less frequently
than annually.”162  Section 7520, in turn, directs the Treasury
Secretary to publish tables setting forth interest rates based on
the interest rates for federal debt.163  These provisions give rise
to a well-known gift tax avoidance opportunity: the grantor
retained annuity trust (GRAT).164
To see how an individual can avoid gift taxes through a
GRAT, imagine that the mother transfers 100 shares of
Facebook stock to a trust, with the trust set to distribute all of
its assets to the son after two years.  As of this writing, shares
of Facebook were trading for around $130, so 100 shares
would be worth roughly $13,000.  Normally, the transfer would
be treated as a gift from mother to son; if the mother had
exhausted her lifetime gift tax exemption ($5.45 million) and
her annual gift tax exclusion ($14,000), then the gift would be
taxed at a 40% rate.165  Now imagine that the trust also trans-
fers a note to the mother obligating the trust to make annual
payments to the mother of $6,735 for two years.  Under the
IRS’s most recent section 7520 tables, the note would be val-
ued (as of this writing) at $13,000.166  The transfer of the note
from the trust to the mother would “zero out” the transfer of the
160 I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
161 § 2702(a)(2)(B).
162 § 2702(b)(1).
163 I.R.C. § 7520(a) (2012).
164 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 153, at 269–71. R
165 E.g., What’s New—Estate and Gift Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Busi-
nesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Whats-New-Estate-and-Gift-Tax
[https://perma.cc/ELP7-KTMA] (last updated Oct. 28, 2016).
166 See Section 7520 Interest Rates, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Section-7520-Interest-Rates [https://perma
.cc/6687-4SVE] (last updated Dec. 22, 2016).  The section 7520 interest rate for
January 2017 is 2.4%.
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Facebook stock from the mother to the trust, resulting in no
gift tax liability.
Readers familiar with the valuation of options but unfamil-
iar with GRATs may find this result peculiar.  If Facebook’s
share price drops and the trust is unable to make payments to
the mother, then the son is not liable: the mother gets whatever
is remaining in the trust and the GRAT is said to have
“failed.”167  But if Facebook’s share price rises and the trust
has assets left over after satisfying its obligations to the
mother, then the gains go to the son. The arrangement essen-
tially amounts to the transfer of a set of call options on
Facebook stock from mother to son.  As of this writing, the
market value of the call options would be in the range of
$2,100.168  Yet under sections 2702 and 7520, the options
worth $2,100 transferred from mother to son would be valued
at zero for gift tax purposes.
Does the text of the Internal Revenue Code require this
anomalous result?  Not necessarily.  Section 7520(b) states
that “[t]his section shall not apply for purposes of . . . any . . .
provision specified in regulations.”169  And section 7805 autho-
rizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title.”170  Exercising his
authority under these provisions, the Secretary might—for in-
stance—promulgate a rule stating that the section 7520 tables
should not be used to value a retained interest if the interest
consists of the right to receive fixed amounts but there is a
substantial risk of nonpayment because the trust is thinly cap-
italized.  The Secretary might set forth specific criteria to assess
whether a trust is thinly capitalized (e.g., if the remainder inter-
est is less than 25% of the trust’s assets).  The Secretary might
point to the language in the definition of “qualified interest”—
“the right to receive fixed amounts”171—and say that an inter-
est does not qualify if the trust’s liabilities are so high relative
to its assets that the “fixed” payments are subject to significant
uncertainty.  The Secretary might also invoke his authority
167 See Andrew Katzenstein & Stephanie Zaffos, When Assets Given to a GRAT
Decline in Value, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5244 (LEXIS) (2010).
168 As of this writing, a call option on one share of Facebook stock with a strike
price of $130 and a January 2018 expiration date was roughly $17; the value of
an otherwise-identical option with a January 2019 expiration date was about $25.
See Facebook, Inc. (FB) Option Chain, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/sym-
bol/fb/option-chain (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).  The GRAT described in text is a
combination of a one-year and two-year call.
169 I.R.C. § 7520(b) (2012).
170 I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
171 I.R.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2012).
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under section 7520(b) to determine that section 7520 shall not
apply under circumstances specified in regulation.172
To be sure, the Secretary’s authority to crack down on
undercapitalized GRATs is not entirely certain.  When the IRS
under President Clinton sought to challenge the Walton fam-
ily’s use of zeroed-out GRATs, the Tax Court ruled in favor of
the Waltons and against the Service.173  Yet in that case, the
Tax Court emphasized that the IRS had not promulgated a
legislative rule restricting zeroed-out GRATs, and the court
suggested that the IRS might receive greater deference if it had
followed the legislative-rule route.174  But instead of initiating a
notice-and-comment process and promulgating new rules, the
Obama administration repeatedly asked Congress to intervene.
The past two Greenbooks, for example, have included a propo-
sal to deny “qualified interest” status when a GRAT is
undercapitalized.175
6. Disallowing the Deduction for Upward Development
Easements
Whatever the uncertainty regarding the President’s ability
to restrict the use of zeroed-out GRATs, his power to crack
down on abuse of section 170(h) seems quite clear.  That provi-
sion allows taxpayers to claim a deduction for a contribution of
a partial interest in real property to a qualified organization if
the contribution is “exclusively for conservation purposes.”176
Section 170(h) also defines “conservation purpose” to include
“the preservation of an historically important land area or a
certified historic structure.”177  Under this provision, a tax-
payer who lives in a house listed in the National Register of
Historic Places or located in a registered historic district might
172 See I.R.C. § 7520(b); I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
173 See Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589, 603–04 (2000).
174 See id. at 597 (“The regulations at issue here are interpretative regula-
tions . . . . Hence, while entitled to considerable weight, they are accorded less
deference than would be legislative regulations issued under a specific grant of
authority to address a matter raised by the pertinent statute.”).
175 See FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 181 (“The proposal also would R
include a requirement that the remainder interest in the GRAT at the time the
interest is created must have a minimum value equal to the greater of 25 percent
of the value of the assets contributed to the GRAT or $500,000 (but not more than
the value of the assets contributed).”); FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 198. R
176 I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C) (2012) (defining “qualified conservation contribution”
to include a contribution “exclusively for conservation purposes”); see also I.R.C.
§ 170(f)(3)(A) (denying a deduction for certain contributions of partial interests in
property); § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (allowing an exception for a “qualified conservation
contribution”).
177 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv).
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donate an easement to an architectural trust that prevents the
taxpayer or any future owner of the house from substantially
altering the exterior or interior of the home; the taxpayer could
claim a deduction for the value of the easement (subject to
certain conditions regarding appraisal and public access).178
Some taxpayers have sought to claim a deduction for contrib-
uting an “air rights” easement to an architectural trust—that
is, an easement restricting development in the air space above
a historic structure they own.179  The Treasury Department
has expressed concerns about “abuses” of section 170(h), spe-
cifically in cases in which taxpayers “have taken large deduc-
tions for contributions of easements restricting the upward
development of historic urban buildings even though such de-
velopment was already restricted by local authorities.”180
President Obama repeatedly asked Congress to pass legis-
lation that would address abuses of the deduction for conser-
vation easements.  In the Greenbook for fiscal year 2014, the
President included a proposal to “disallow a deduction for any
value of an historic preservation easement associated with for-
gone upward development above an historic building.”181  The
President reiterated this proposal in his Greenbooks for fiscal
years 2015, 2016, and 2017.182  The President did not, how-
ever, instruct the Treasury Department to take regulatory ac-
tion against deductions for upward development easements,
even though the executive branch likely has the authority to
prohibit such deductions on its own.
Recall that the relevant statutory definition of “conserva-
tion purpose” is “the preservation of an historically important
land area or a certified historic structure.”183  The Treasury
could promulgate regulations stating that restrictions on up-
ward development do not “preserv[e]” an important land area or
historic structure.184  A taxpayer challenging the regulation
would have a difficult time arguing that the term “historically
important land area” unambiguously includes air rights: after
all, at least for easements applying to air space above an ex-
178 E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(v) (2016), ex. 1.
179 See, e.g., Herman v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 197, at *18, *23 (2009)
(involving a taxpayer who sought to claim a deduction for contributing an air
rights easement to preserve a certified historic structure).
180 FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 162. R
181 Id.
182 See FY 2015 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 196; FY 2016 Greenbook, supra R
note 35, at 188–89; FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 216. R
183 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) (2012).
184 Herman, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) at *12 (alteration in original) (quoting I.R.C.
§ 170(h)(4)(A)(iv)).
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isting structure, the land is already covered by a building.  A
taxpayer would also have trouble convincing a court that the
term “certified historic structure” unambiguously includes air
space above the structure.  In one case, Tax Court Judge David
Gustafson noted that “[i]t might be argued that the appearance
of a structure is ‘preserved’ in an aesthetic sense by an ease-
ment that prevents vertical development above its existing
height,” but Judge Gustafson’s opinion does not suggest that
this argument would prevail.  (He ultimately concluded that the
deduction claim failed on other grounds, even “[a]ssuming ar-
guendo that there can be circumstances in which an ‘air rights’
easement accomplishes the preservation of a ‘structure.’”)185
And if there is any ambiguity as to whether an air rights ease-
ment “preserv[es]” a historic “structure,” the only question in
court would be whether the Treasury regulation “is a ‘reasona-
ble interpretation’ of the enacted text.”186  On that standard, it
is difficult to see how the Treasury would lose.
7. Denying a Deduction for Payment of Punitive Damages
Section 162(a) allows taxpayers to claim a deduction for
“all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur-
ing the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.”187
In 1969, Congress added a new section 162(f) that denies a
deduction for “any fine or similar penalty paid to a government
for the violation of any law.”188  The IRS, applying the rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, has interpreted the 1969
law to mean that payments of punitive damages are deductible,
at least where such damages are “incurred by the taxpayer in
the ordinary conduct of its business operations.”189  The
Obama administration called on Congress each year since
2009 to change this rule and deny a deduction for punitive
damages paid upon a judgment or in settlement of a claim.190
Disallowing the deduction entirely would raise, according to
185 Id. at *23.
186 Id. at *12 (alteration in original) (quoting I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv)); Mayo
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58 (2011).
187 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012).
188 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(f), 83 Stat. 710 (1969).
189 Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57.
190 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 117; FY 2011 Greenbook, supra R
note 35, at 95; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 63; FY 2013 Greenbook, R
supra note 35, at 139; FY 2014 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 95; FY 2015 Green- R
book, supra note 35, at 101; FY 2016 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 116; FY 2017 R
Greenbook, supra note 35, at 111. R
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the Treasury’s most recent estimate, $741 million over a
decade.191
In a 1996 law review article, Kimberly Pace, then a law
clerk to a judge on the Federal Circuit, suggested that section
162 as it stands does not require the conclusion that punitive
damages are deductible.192  (Kimberly Pace is now Kimberly
Moore, and she is no longer a clerk to a Federal Circuit judge
but a Federal Circuit judge herself.)  Pace’s article pointed to
two paths that the Treasury and IRS might follow if they sought
to argue against deductibility.  First, Pace suggested that pay-
ments of punitive damages might fall within the ambit of sec-
tion 162(f): they may amount to a “fine or similar penalty paid
to a government for the violation of any law.”193  This argument
runs into the obvious obstacle that punitive damages are gen-
erally paid to private plaintiffs and not “paid to a government,”
although there are important exceptions. Certain statutes,
such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (the “Superfund” law), al-
low the federal government to seek punitive damages.194  When
punitive damages are paid to a federal or state government
plaintiff, the IRS might reasonably argue that such damages
are a “penalty . . . for the violation of the law” and thus the
section 162(f) exception applies.  Moreover, eight states cur-
rently have “split-recovery” statutes providing for partial pay-
ment of punitive damages awards to state funds.195  The IRS
might argue (again, quite reasonably) that the portion of puni-
tive damages awards payable to the state is nondeductible for
federal tax purposes.196
Another possible—though more controversial—approach
would be for the Treasury and IRS to argue that punitive dam-
191 FY 2017 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 267 tbl.1. R
192 Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who
Should Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825,
828 (1996).
193 Id. at 827, 872–78 (quoting I.R.C. § 162(f) (2012)).
194 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (c)(3) (2012); see also, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2207(a) (2012)
(if the Secretary of Defense finds that contractor “offered or gave any gratuity . . .
to an officer, official, or employee of the United States to obtain a contract or
favorable treatment . . . concerning the . . . contract,” the United States “is entitled
to exemplary damages in an amount at least three, but not more than 10 . . . times
the cost incurred by the contractor in giving gratuities”); 33 U.S.C. § 1514(c)
(2012) (punitive damages payable to the United States for willful violation of
statutes and regulations related to deepwater ports).
195 Skyler M. Sanders, Comment, Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Prob-
lem: A Federal Split-Recovery Statute or a Federal Tax?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 785 app.
A at 833–36 (2013).
196 See Pace, supra note 192, at 876. R
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ages are not “ordinary and necessary” business expenses
under section 162(a).  As the Supreme Court recently noted,
“[p]unitive damages have long been an available remedy at
common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.”197
Pace asks: “How could a corporation claim, or a court hold,
that behavior which rises to that egregious level is a necessary
part of doing business, or that such an expense is an ordinary,
unavoidable part of business?”198  Note, moreover, that if the
Treasury promulgated regulations interpreting section 162 to
disallow a deduction for punitive damages, the relevant ques-
tion under Chevron and Mayo Foundation would be whether
the Treasury’s interpretation of the phrase “ordinary and nec-
essary” is “permissible”—not whether the Treasury’s interpre-
tation of the statutory language is the best reading of the text.
To be sure, the argument that the Treasury has authority
to disallow deductions for punitive damages under section 162
is far from airtight.  In addition to the expressio unius implica-
tion from section 162(f), the Senate Finance Committee report
accompanying the 1969 law is inconvenient: the report states
that the statutory exceptions to the general rule of deductibility
under section 162 are “intended to be all inclusive.”199  The
Treasury might argue that the expressio unius canon is a guide
rather than an ironclad rule200 and that one-house legislative
history is not determinative.201  The point here is simply that
the administration would have a plausible (though admittedly
not rock solid) basis for regulations that either partially or fully
disallow deductions for punitive damages payments under the
existing section 162, without further legislative action.
197 Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409 (2009).
198 Pace, supra note 192, at 879–80. R
199 Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. REP. NO. 91–552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 274
(1969).
200 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (“[T]he
canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing
or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an ‘associ-
ated group or series,’ justifying the inference that items not mentioned were
excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.” (quoting United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002))).
201 See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137,
149–150 n.4 (2002) (“[A] single Committee Report from one House of a politically
divided Congress . . . is a rather slender reed. . . .”).  The 91st Congress was not
politically divided, but a court disinclined to follow legislative history could no
doubt find reason to disregard such history here.
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F. Cases of Congressional Action
The examples above all were instances in which the Presi-
dent asked Congress for a legislative change instead of pro-
ceeding through regulation and Congress rebuffed the
President’s request.  The Greenbook is not, however, an en-
tirely empty exercise: sometimes Congress does act on the
President’s proposals—including proposals that the President,
through the Treasury and IRS, could have implemented on his
own.  This section discusses some instances in which Congress
has adopted Greenbook proposals that the administration
likely could have implemented via regulation.
1. Preventing Taxpayers from “Splitting” Foreign Income
and Foreign Tax Credits
One such example involves the “splitting” of foreign income
and foreign tax credits.  The “technical taxpayer rule,” promul-
gated by the Treasury Department in 1983, provides that the
person who can claim the foreign tax credit is “the person on
whom foreign law imposes legal liability for such tax,” even if
another person actually pays the tax.202  Until recently, the
technical taxpayer rule allowed a U.S. taxpayer to claim a for-
eign tax credit for the current year even though the income on
which that foreign tax was paid might not be subject to U.S.
income tax until a future year (or, in some cases, might never
be subject to U.S. income tax).  In a typical “splitting” arrange-
ment, a U.S. corporation (the grandparent) would establish an
entity in Luxembourg (the parent) that would be disregarded
under U.S. check-the-box rules; however, the parent would
qualify as a corporation for Luxembourg tax purposes.203  The
parent, in turn, would own another Luxembourg entity (the
child), which would generate income subject to tax in Luxem-
bourg.204  Since Luxembourg law imposes legal liability for the
tax on the parent entity rather than the child corporation, the
parent entity would be considered the “technical taxpayer”
under the Treasury rule.205  Because the parent entity was a
disregarded entity under the U.S. check-the-box regime, the
U.S. grandparent would be able to claim the foreign tax credit.
But the income earned by the child corporation would not be
202 Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(f) (as amended in 2012); see T.D. 7918, 1983-2 C.B.
113 (1983).
203 See, e.g., Guardian Indus. Corp. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1368, 1369–70
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing a typical splitting arrangement).
204 See id.
205 See id. at 1374.
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subject to U.S. tax unless and until it was repatriated.  The
arrangement thus allowed the U.S. grandparent to split the
foreign tax credit (which it would claim immediately) from the
corresponding income (on which it potentially could defer U.S.
tax indefinitely).206
The Treasury Department under President George W. Bush
proposed regulations addressing credit-splitting arrangements,
but the Treasury Department did not finalize those regula-
tions.207  Then in the fiscal year 2010 Greenbook, President
Obama asked Congress to pass legislation to prevent credit
splitting, even though the opportunity for splitting was an op-
portunity created by the Treasury Department’s own technical
taxpayer rule rather than by statute.208  At the time, the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation asked “whether congressional
action is necessary” or “whether, instead, the IRS and Treasury
Department could simply finalize the proposed regulations . . .
in the desired form.”209  Nonetheless, Congress passed—and
President Obama signed—legislation providing that taxpayers
cannot claim a foreign tax credit until the related income is
taken into account.210
2. Matching OID Deductions with Income Inclusions
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 amended the statutory
rules regarding original issue discounts to add a special rule for
OID on obligations to related foreign persons. The amendment
prevented the obligor (i.e., borrower) from claiming a deduction
until the obligee (i.e., lender) has been paid.211  In January
1993, shortly before President George H.W. Bush left office, the
Treasury Department finalized regulations carving out an ex-
emption from the special rule for cases in which the related
foreign person is a foreign personal holding company (FPHC), a
controlled foreign corporation (CFC), or a passive foreign in-
vestment company (PFIC).212  The 1993 rule allowed a taxpayer
to claim a deduction for OID as of the day on which a corre-
206 See id. at 1375 (holding that the U.S. grandparent corporation could claim
an immediate foreign tax credit under similar circumstances).
207 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(f), 71 Fed. Reg. 44,240 (Aug. 4, 2006).
208 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 31. R
209 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-4-09, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL—PART
THREE: PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME AND INVEST-
MENT 100 (2009).
210 Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 211(a), 124 Stat. 2389, 2394 (2010).
211 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 128(c), 98 Stat. 494, 654 (1984); see I.R.C.
§ 163(e)(3)(A) (2012).
212 See T.D. 8465, 1993-1 C.B. 28 (1993).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 46 20-MAR-17 15:29
678 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:633
sponding amount is includible in the income of the FPHC, CFC,
or PFIC, without waiting until the amount is paid.213  However,
an amount may be includible in the income of an FPHC, CFC,
or PFIC before it is includible in the income of the entity’s U.S.
owners.  This meant that U.S. taxpayers, in some cases, could
claim a deduction for OID on debt to a related foreign person
even though no money changed hands and no other U.S. tax-
payer included that amount in income.214
Since the opportunity for mismatch of deductions and in-
come inclusions had been created by a Treasury regulation, the
Clinton administration could have prevented mismatch by re-
scinding that regulation.  Instead, the Clinton administration
asked Congress in the Greenbooks for fiscal years 2000 and
2001 to override the Treasury rule by statute.215  Congress
took no action for several years.  Ultimately, the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 did away with exemption for obligations to
CFCs and PFICs; now, taxpayers can only claim deductions for
OID on obligations to related CFCs and PFICs when a corre-
sponding amount is included in the income of a U.S. person
who owns stock in the CFC or PFIC.216
3. Requiring Information Reporting on Payments to
Corporations
Since 1954, section 6041 of the Code has imposed infor-
mation-reporting requirements with respect to payments of
$600 or more in the course of a taxpayer’s trade or business.
Specifically, section 6041 states that “[a]ll persons engaged in a
trade or business and making payment in the course of such
trade or business to another person . . . of $600 or more in any
taxable year . . . shall render a true and accurate return” notify-
ing the IRS of the amount of the payment and the name and
address of the recipient.217  By its terms, the reporting require-
ment covers payments made to corporations; the Code has long
defined “person” to include “an individual, a trust, estate, part-
nership, association, company or corporation.”218  However,
213 See id.
214 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 149, at 315–17 (2000). R
215 FY 2000 Greenbook, supra note 158, at 114; FY 2001 Greenbook, supra R
note 158, at 133–34. R
216 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 841, 118 Stat. 1418, 1597 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 163(e)(3)(B)(i)).  The 2004 Act also eliminated the FPHC status for future tax
years.
217 I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2012)  (original version at Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
68A Stat. 3, 745 (1954)).
218 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2012) (original version at Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 68A Stat. 3, 911 (1954)).
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Treasury regulations dating back to 1960 carved out an exemp-
tion for “[p]ayments of any type made to corporations.”219
The reporting exemption for payments to corporations
opened up opportunities for tax evasion.  As the National Tax-
payer Advocate noted in her 2007 annual report to Congress,
“[o]ne possible justification for the corporate exception to the
information reporting requirements is that large corporations
are less likely to underreport income than sole proprietors be-
cause they must account to unrelated shareholders for busi-
ness earnings and expenses,” but “these safeguards may not be
present in many closely-held corporations.”220  The Taxpayer
Advocate called for repeal of the exemption, and the Treasury
Department under President George W. Bush agreed.  But
rather than instructing his Treasury Department to repeal the
regulations that created the exemption, President Bush instead
asked Congress to act legislatively.221
Why would the President ask Congress to change the tax
statutes in order to require reporting for payments of $600 or
more to corporations, when a statute requiring reporting for
such payments had been on the books for more than a half
century?  The Bush administration briefly addressed this ques-
tion in the Greenbook for fiscal year 2009: “Although the excep-
tion for information reporting to corporations is set forth in
existing regulations, because it has been in place for many
years and because Congress, during that time period, has
made numerous changes to the information reporting rules,
elimination of the exception should be made by legislative
change.”222  The Bush administration estimated that repeal of
the exemption would raise more than $8.2 billion in revenue
over the next decade due to greater compliance, but it declined
to take action without congressional cooperation.223
Ultimately, Congress did eliminate the exemption for pay-
ments to corporations as part of the Affordable Care Act of
2010.  The ACA added a new subsection (i) to section 6041,
which read: “Notwithstanding any regulation prescribed by the
219 Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(c) (1960).  The 1960 regulations made an exception
to the exception (i.e., required reporting for) for certain rebates and refunds to
corporations.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6044, 1.6044-1 (1960).  Nonetheless, the vast ma-
jority of payments to corporations were exempt from reporting under the 1960
rules.
220 1 NINA E. OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE:
2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 495 (2007).
221 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2009 REVENUE PROPOSALS 63 (2008).
222 Id.
223 See id.
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Secretary before the date of the enactment of this subsection,
for purposes of this section the term ‘person’ includes any cor-
poration that is not an organization exempt from tax under
section 501(a).”224  But subsection (i) was short-lived: Congress
repealed it the following year; President Obama signed the re-
peal legislation; and payments to corporations remain exempt
from the section 6041 reporting requirement.225
G. Back on the Regulatory Road
The inclusion of a proposal in the Greenbook does not, of
course, preclude the same President or a successor from imple-
menting the proposal via executive action.  In at least three
cases, the Treasury and IRS have used their authority under
existing statutes to implement a Greenbook proposal that pre-
vious Congresses rebuffed.
1. Treating Signing Bonuses as “Wages” for FICA Taxes
Since 1954, section 3402 has required employers to with-
hold tax on payments of “wages.”226  In 1958, the IRS issued a
revenue ruling that addressed the application of section 3402
to bonus payments made to baseball players.227  The IRS con-
cluded that a bonus “paid to a new player solely for signing his
first contract, without any requirement of subsequent service,”
did not constitute “wages,” and thus the baseball club was not
required to withhold tax on the bonus.228  The Federal Insur-
ance Contributions Act (FICA) uses a definition of “wages” simi-
lar to the withholding statute, and thus the 1958 ruling
indicated that signing bonuses would be exempt from Social
Security and Medicare taxes as well if there was no subse-
quent-service requirement.229
In the Greenbooks for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the Clin-
ton administration included a proposal that would effectively
override the 1958 revenue ruling and clarify that signing bo-
nuses are “wages” for withholding and employment tax pur-
poses, regardless of whether the bonus is conditioned on
224 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9006(a), 124 Stat. 119, 855 (2010).
225 Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange
Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, § 3(a), 125 Stat. 36, 36
(2011).
226 I.R.C. § 3402 (2012).
227 Rev. Rul. 58-145, 1958-1 C.B. 360.
228 Id.
229 See I.R.C. § 3121 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 49 20-MAR-17 15:29
2017] THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO TAX 681
subsequent service.230  However, congressional action is gener-
ally not necessary to reverse a revenue ruling; the IRS can
simply revoke the revenue ruling and issue a new one.  Indeed,
the IRS did exactly that in 2004: it issued a new revenue ruling
revoking the 1958 decision and interpreting the term “wages”
to include signing bonuses broadly.  The 2004 ruling provided
a straightforward justification for the IRS’s revised interpreta-
tion: “amounts an employer pays an employee as remuneration
for employment are wages”; “[e]mployment encompasses the
establishment . . . of the employer-employee relationship”; so
signing bonuses are wages if paid “in connection with estab-
lishing the employer-employee relationship.”231  The revenue
ruling accomplished what the Greenbook proposal would have:
signing bonuses are now considered wages for FICA and with-
holding purposes even if the bonuses are not contingent upon
subsequent service.
The signing bonus change likely had a modest effect on
revenues: according to the Clinton administration’s last Green-
book, a reform along the same lines as the 2004 IRS ruling
would raise receipts by $28 million over a decade.232  What is
more remarkable is how rare it was before the Obama adminis-
tration’s April 2016 inversion actions for the Treasury to re-
spond to the rebuff of a Greenbook request by implementing
the measure via regulation.
2. Restricting Earnings Stripping by Expatriated Entities
After an Inversion
Section 7874, enacted in 2004, sets forth specific rules
that apply when a U.S. corporation is acquired by a foreign
corporation and, after the acquisition, at least 60% of the stock
of the combined entity is held by shareholders of the former
U.S. corporation.233  The U.S. corporation—now a subsidiary of
the foreign parent—is treated as an “expatriated entity,” and
for the first ten years after the inversion it is limited in its
ability to claim deductions and credits for U.S. tax purposes.234
230 FY 2000 Greenbook, supra note 158, at 183; FY 2001 Greenbook, supra R
note 158, at 191–92. R
231 Rev. Rul. 2004-109, 2004-2 C.B. 959–61.
232 FY 2001 Greenbook, supra note 158, at 226 tbl. R
233 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2) (2012).  The provision also applies to the acquisition of
U.S. partnerships by foreign corporations.
234 See § 7874(a)(1), (d), (e).  If shareholders of the former domestic corporation
hold 80% or more of the combined entity after the inversion, the transaction is
essentially disregarded and the foreign parent is subject to U.S. tax as if it were a
U.S. corporation. See § 7874(b).
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These limitations do not, however, apply when the new mul-
tinational group created by combining the foreign parent and
the U.S. corporation has “substantial business activities in the
foreign country in which . . . [the foreign parent] is created or
organized, when compared to the [group’s] total business activ-
ities.”235  Moreover, the limitations do little to prevent the U.S.
subsidiary from reducing its U.S. tax liabilities through “earn-
ings stripping” following an inversion.  To see how an earnings-
stripping strategy might work, imagine that a U.S. corporation
inverts by merging with an Irish corporation and then issues a
note as a dividend to the new Irish parent; the U.S. corporation
would then pay interest on the note to the Irish parent and
deduct those interest payments from U.S. income.  The interest
payment would be exempt from U.S. withholding tax under the
U.S.-Ireland tax treaty and subject to only a 12.5% Irish corpo-
rate tax.236  The net result would be to reduce the multina-
tional group’s tax rate on U.S. income from 35% (the top U.S.
corporate income tax rate) to 12.5% (the Irish rate).237
The Obama administration implemented a number of rela-
tively modest regulatory measures to limit corporate inversions
prior to 2016.238  Meanwhile, the President asked Congress to
act to pass legislation limiting earnings stripping in connection
with corporate inversions.  President Obama’s first Greenbook
included a proposal that would limit the ability of “expatriated
entities” to engage in earnings-stripping transactions with their
foreign affiliates; under that proposal, a U.S. corporation that
235 § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii).
236 See IRS, CAT. NO. 46849F, PUBLICATION 901: U.S. TAX TREATIES (2016); Wil-
lard B. Taylor, Letter to the Editor, A Comment on Eric Solomon’s Article on Corpo-
rate Inversions, 137 TAX NOTES 105 (2012).
237 Section 163(j) is designed to limit earnings stripping, but in practice it has
failed to prevent U.S. corporations from using related party debt to zero out their
U.S. income tax liabilities following an inversion. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME
TAX TREATIES 29 (2007); Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate
Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J.
805, 807 (2004).
238 In 2012, the Treasury Department promulgated temporary regulations in-
terpreting the term “substantial business activities” in section 7874 to mean that
at least 25% of the employees, assets, and income of the multinational group
must be located in or derived from the relevant foreign country. See T.D. 9592,
2012-28 I.R.B. 41.  The 25% figure marked a change from temporary regulations
promulgated by the Bush Treasury Department in 2006 that interpreted the term
“substantial business activities” to mean at least 10% of employees, assets, and
income.  The Treasury and the IRS promulgated additional rules regarding inver-
sions in 2014 and 2015, but none of these measures materially limited earnings
stripping by inverted firms. See IRS Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712; IRS
Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775.
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engages in an inversion could not reduce its taxable income by
more than 25% through intragroup debt.239  For the next four
years, the President’s Greenbook included the same propo-
sal;240 every time, Congress failed to act.  Meanwhile, more
than two-dozen U.S. corporations completed inversion
transactions.241
Outside the administration, several tax lawyers and aca-
demics—most notably former Treasury Tax Official and
Harvard Law School lecturer Stephen Shay—argued that the
Treasury already had ample authority to limit earnings strip-
ping by U.S. corporations that invert.242  One important source
of executive branch authority is section 385 of the Code, which
authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe such regula-
tions as may be necessary or appropriate” to determine
whether an interest in a corporation should be treated as debt
or equity.243  Shay argued that the Treasury could use its au-
thority under section 385 to classify as “equity” any debt issued
by a U.S. corporation to a foreign affiliate as part of an earn-
ings-stripping transaction.244
In April 2016, the Obama administration took up a version
of Shay’s proposal.  (As noted in the introduction, the action
came after pharmaceutical giant Pfizer announced plans to
merge with Irish counterpart Allergan—a transaction that Pfi-
zer said would reduce its tax bill by $1 billion a year.)245  Per-
haps most significantly, the Treasury Department published
239 See FY 2010 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 33. R
240 FY 2011 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 46; FY 2012 Greenbook, supra note R
35, at 47; FY 2013 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 92; FY 2014 Greenbook, supra R
note 35, at 53. R
241 Zachary Mider & Jesse Drucker, Tax Inversion: How U.S. Companies Buy
Tax Breaks, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-
inversion [https://perma.cc/G9DH-XBN6] (last updated Apr. 6, 2016).
242 Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate Expa-
triations, TAX ANALYSTS (July 28, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/mr-
secretary-take-tax-juice-out-corporate-expatriations [https://perma.cc/7KN6-
ZF36]; see also Victor Fleischer, How Obama Can Stop Corporate Expatriations,
for Now, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 7, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/08/07/how-obama-can-stop-corporate-expatriations-for-now [https://per
ma.cc/9DHK-AWFW]; Steven M. Rosenthal, Professor Shay Got It Right: Treasury
Can Slow Inversions, TAX ANALYSTS (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.taxanalysts.org/
content/professor-shay-got-it-right-treasury-can-slow-inversions [https://perma
.cc/CH8F-N6LG].
243 I.R.C. § 385(a) (2012).
244 See Shay, supra note 242. R
245 See Michael Hiltzik, Pfizer Shows that Its Allergan Merger Was Only a Tax
Dodge, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-
hiltzik-pfizer-allergan-20160406-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/H62Y-
72AT].
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proposed regulations providing that when a U.S. corporation
issues a note to a foreign affiliate as part of a dividend distribu-
tion, the note will be treated as equity rather than debt (and
thus the U.S. corporation’s “interest[ ]” on the note will be non-
deductible).246  The proposed regulation and other temporary
and final regulations promulgated in April 2016247 substan-
tially limit the tax benefits for U.S. corporations that merge into
foreign counterparts.
3. Curbing Valuation Discounts in Family Limited
Partnerships
For decades, wealthy individuals have used “family limited
partnerships” (FLPs) to avoid estate and gift taxes on transfers
to children and other relatives.  To see how taxpayers can ac-
complish this objective through FLPs, consider the following
example: A mother forms a corporation to which she contrib-
utes $1.  The mother then forms a limited partnership with
herself as the limited partner and the corporation as the gen-
eral partner; the limited partnership holds $100 in assets, with
$1 from the corporation and $99 directly from the mother.  The
mother then transfers half her limited partnership interest to
her son and half to her daughter.  But instead of reporting the
value of the gift to each child as $49.50 (half of $99), the
mother reports that the value of each gift is $33 (two-thirds of
$49.50).  She claims that the value of each child’s limited part-
nership interest is less than $49.50 because neither child can
force the partnership to be liquidated: the corporation, as the
general partner, remains in charge.248  This maneuver allows
the mother to transfer more to her children than she otherwise
could without incurring gift tax liabilities.
Section 2704, enacted in 1990, authorizes the Treasury
Secretary to promulgate regulations disregarding restrictions
on liquidation of a partnership in determining the amount of a
gift if the restriction “does not ultimately reduce the value of
such interest to the transferee.”249  Yet instead of exercising
this authority initially, the Obama administration sought con-
gressional support for changes to the FLP rules.  A proposal in
the President’s Greenbook for fiscal year 2013 would have
246 Prop. Treas. Reg §§ 1.385-1 to -4, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,226 (June 21, 2016).
247 See T.D. 9761, 2016-20 I.R.B. 743 (May 16, 2016).
248 For a similar example, see Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Family Limited Partnerships: Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 FLA.
TAX. REV. 649, 650–51 (2004).
249 I.R.C. § 2704(b)(4) (2012).
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curbed valuation discounts for FLP interests where another
family member has the authority to lift any restrictions on liq-
uidation.250  The Treasury Department estimated that the
change would save more than $18 billion over the course of a
decade.251
The Obama administration’s FLP proposal went nowhere in
Congress.  Finally, in August 2016, the Treasury Department
published proposed regulations that utilize the authority
granted to the Treasury under section 2704.252  The details of
the proposal lie beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it to
say (as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for tax policy
announced in a blog post) that the new rules “significantly
reduce the ability of [wealthy] taxpayers and their estates to
use [FLP] techniques solely for the purpose of lowering their
estate and gift taxes.”253
The Obama administration’s April 2016 actions on inver-
sions and the August 2016 proposed rules on FLPs are impor-
tant exceptions to the claim that the President rarely resorts to
regulation when Congress rebuffs his requests for revenue-
raising legislation.  Yet as argued below,254 the timing of these
measures is consistent with a model of executive-legislation
interactions that also accounts for the general reluctance of
President Obama and his predecessors to implement revenue-
raising tax measures unilaterally.  For now, keep in mind the
facts that (a) the Obama administration ultimately did act with-
out Congress to implement two important measures previously
on the President’s legislative agenda and (b) these actions oc-
curred in the last year of the President’s second term, at a time
of legislative gridlock, and as polls and prediction markets indi-
cated (incorrectly, as it turned out) a very high likelihood of the
President’s party retaining the White House.255
250 See FY 2013 Greenbook, supra note 35, at 79. R
251 Id. at 202 tbl.1.
252 Prop. Treas. Reg §§ 25.2701, 25.2704, 81 Fed. Reg. 51,413 (Aug. 4, 2016).
253 Mark J. Mazur, Treasury Issues Proposed Regulations to Close Estate and
Gift Tax Loophole, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY: TREASURY NOTES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://
www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Treasury-Issues-Proposed-Regulations-
to-Close-Estate-and-Gift-Tax-Loophole.aspx [https://perma.cc/V7UZ-NA8U].
254 See infra notes 324–326 and accompanying text. R
255 See 2016 General Election: Trump vs. Clinton, HUFFINGTON POST POLLSTER,
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-general-election-trump-vs-
clinton [https://perma.cc/54ZK-3RUQ] (showing Hillary Clinton leading Donald
Trump by nine percentage points on April 4, 2016, the date the inversion actions
were announced, and by eight percentage points on August 2, the date the pro-
posed FLP rules were announced); Market Quotes: Pres16_WTA, IOWA ELECTRONIC
MKTS, https://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/quotes/Pres16_quotes.html [https://per
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H. Congressional “Overrides” of Revenue Raising
Regulations
Even when the President and his Treasury Department do
decide to act unilaterally, that is not necessarily the end of the
story.  Congress still may seek to prevent the Treasury from
finalizing or implementing regulations.  On several occasions,
Congress has passed measures that stopped the Treasury De-
partment from moving forward with a regulatory initiative.  The
year 1978 was a high watermark for congressional action of
this sort.  In that year, Congress passed legislation temporarily
prohibiting the Treasury from issuing regulations regarding the
definition of “fringe benefits,”256 the deductibility of commuting
expenses,257 and the classification of workers as “employee[s]”
or “independent contractor[s]” for employment tax purposes.258
(The moratorium on regulations addressing the employee/in-
dependent contractor distinction was later extended to be a
permanent ban.)259  Congress also enacted a prohibition on
regulations regarding the timing of taxes on non-qualified de-
ferred compensation plan payments in the private sector.260
That measure was aimed at blocking an unpopular proposed
Treasury regulation,261 and the prohibition survived for a quar-
ma.cc/2FTC-UZGF] (showing that the prediction-market odds of Clinton beating
Trump were about 69% on April 4 and 73% on August 2).
256 Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996 (1978).  The moratorium was
initially set to expire at the end of 1979 but was extended through 1983. See
I.R.C. § 61 note (2012).
257 § 2, 92 Stat. at 996.  The IRS had sought to limit the deductibility of certain
commuting expenses in a 1976 revenue ruling. See Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B.
86.  The 1978 legislation, as later amended, prevented the IRS from implementing
the ruling until the end of May 1981. See I.R.C. § 62 note (2012).
258 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2886 (1978)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 3401 note); see also WILLIAM HAYS WEISSMAN, NAT’L
ASS’N OF TAX REPORTING & PROF. MGMT., SECTION 530: ITS HISTORY AND APPLICATION IN
LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FOR FED-
ERAL TAX PURPOSES 2–9 (2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irpac-br_530_re
lief_-_appendix_natrm_paper_09032009.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGY7-EZY9]
(discussing history of ban on employee/independent contractor regulations and
revenue rulings).
259 I.R.C. § 3401 note.
260 Revenue Act of 1978, § 132.  Specifically, the Revenue Act of 1978 said that
“[t]he taxable year of inclusion in gross income of any amount covered by a private
deferred compensation plan shall be determined in accordance with the principles
set forth in regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions . . . which were in effect on
February 1” of that year. Id. The statutory language effectively made any subse-
quent Treasury action on the subject null and void.
261 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4,638 (Feb. 3, 1978).
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ter century.262  Similarly, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 im-
posed an eleven-month moratorium on Treasury regulations
regarding the definition of “limited partner” for purposes of
federal self-employment income taxes.263  And in December
2015, Congress passed an appropriations rider barring the
Treasury Department from using any funds to finalize pro-
posed regulations regarding the involvement of tax-exempt or-
ganizations in political campaigns.264
These congressional overrides might lead some readers to
question whether the executive branch really has the authority
to implement revenue-raising measures on its own.  Note,
though, that in the 1978, 1997, and 2015 cases, the President
signed the bill imposing a moratorium or ban on regulatory
action.  Presidents Carter (in 1978), Clinton (in 1997), and
Obama (in 2015) were unwilling to use their veto power in order
to defend the Treasury Department’s revenue-raising efforts.
Of course, if the President had exercised his veto power in any
of these instances, members of Congress might have sought to
override the veto.  However, veto overrides with respect to tax
bills are rarer than lightning strikes: the last time that Con-
gress overrode a President’s veto of tax-related legislation was
in 1948, when Harry Truman was in the White House.265
To be sure, Congress has other tools to express its opposi-
tion to revenue-raising executive action—and has ways aside
from a veto override to punish the President for proceeding
unilaterally.  The Senate can refuse to confirm the President’s
262 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–357, § 885, 118
Stat. 1418, 1634 (2004) (codified at I.R.C. § 409A (2012)); Michael Doran, Time to
Start Over on Deferred Compensation, 28 VA. TAX. REV. 223, 224 (2008).
263 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat. 788, 882
(1997).  The 1997 legislation came in response to a controversial notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, see Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.1402(a)-2, 62 Fed. Reg. 1,702 (Jan.
13, 1997); rather than waiting for the 11-month period to pass, the Treasury
declined to finalize the proposed rules even after the moratorium ended. See
Lucia Nasuti Smeal & Tad D. Ransopher, LLC Material Participation Policy Shift:
New Regulations Focus on Management Rights, 2013 J. LEGAL ISSUES & CASES IN
BUS. 1, 8.
264 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 127,
129 Stat. 2242 (2015).  The regulations would have denied tax-exempt status to
organizations that engage in “candidate-related political activity.”  Prop. Treas.
Reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013); see Paul C. Barton,
Confusion Over Judging Political Activity Still Reigns at IRS, TAX NOTES (Feb. 4,
2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/featured-article/confusion-over-judging-politi-
cal-activity-still-reigns-irs [https://perma.cc/BT3V-EE27].
265 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (1948); see also Summary
of Bills Vetoed, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm [https://perma.cc/7Z5X-9SMK].
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nominees for Treasury posts266 and also can refuse to ratify tax
treaties that the President supports.267  Moreover, both the
House and the Senate can summon the administration’s top
tax officials before committees for time-consuming hearings.268
Note, though, tax is not unique in this regard: in other areas,
Congress likewise can hold up nominations and haul adminis-
tration officials before oversight committees for grueling hear-
ings.269  And yet recent Presidents have not been reluctant to
proceed unilaterally in the face of potential congressional oppo-
sition—and retaliation—on a wide range of non-tax matters.
I. The Tax Cutter in Chief
Some of the examples above involved a President asking
Congress to override a prior administration’s action that had
tested the limits of executive authority.  Consider the decision
by the first Bush administration to exempt obligations to
FPHCs, CFCs, and PFICs from the rules otherwise applicable to
OID debt (a decision ultimately overridden by Congress in
2004).270  The Treasury acknowledged in the notice announc-
ing the proposed regulation that the special treatment of
FPHCs, CFCs, and PFICs was “a substantial exception to the
otherwise applicable general rule” for OID debt, but it cited no
statutory provision supporting such an exception, nor did it
point to any part of the relevant legislative history indicating
that the exemption was consistent with congressional
intent.271
266 See Shamik Trivedi, Top Tax Nominees in Limbo, with Politics to Blame, 134
TAX NOTES 522, 522 (2012) (noting that for the first three years of the Obama
presidency, the Senate refused to confirm President Obama’s nominees to the
posts of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy and Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Justice Department’s Tax Division).
267 Indeed, Senate rules empower a single Senator to effectively block a nomi-
nation or treaty from going through. See Ryan Finley & William Hoke, Tax Treaty
Awaiting U.S. Senate Vote Face Uncertain Future, 2015 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 219
(2015) (noting that Senator Rand Paul, a Kentucky Republican, has held up eight
pending tax treaties due to concerns about taxpayer privacy protections).
268 See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, I.R.S. Commissioner John Koskinen, on Hot Seat,
Has History of Bureaucratic Rescue Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/irs-commissioner-john-koskinen-on-hot-seat-
has-history-of-bureaucratic-rescue-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/V963-MW22]
(noting that IRS Commissioner John Koskinen “absorbed cascades of verbal
salvos” from members of Congress at one hearing lasting “nearly four hours”).
269 The need for Senate ratification of tax treaties is one distinguishing feature
of tax law—there is no obvious equivalent with respect to examples like health or
labor policy.
270 See supra section I.F.2.
271 Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.163-12, 1.267(a)-3, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,531 (1991).
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Several other Treasury actions addressed above seem to fit
this mold: examples include the exemption from section 6041
for corporations carved out by the Treasury Department under
President Eisenhower,272 the safe harbor for dual capacity tax-
payers created by the Treasury Department under President
Reagan,273 and—arguably—the decision by the Treasury De-
partment at the start of the Clinton administration allowing
carried interest profits to be taxed at preferential rates.274  For
present purposes, I will focus on three Treasury actions—one
from each of the past three administrations—that represent
particularly bold assertions of executive power in a taxpayer-
friendly direction.  The first, alluded to above, is the 1996 rule
promulgated by the Treasury under President Clinton estab-
lishing the check-the-box regime.  The second is a set of rules
promulgated under the second President Bush and commonly
known as the “INDOPCO regulations” though perhaps better
termed the “anti-INDOPCO regulations” because they effectively
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner.275  The third is the Treasury Department’s deci-
sion under President Obama allowing General Motors to make
use of $45 billion in net operating loss carryforwards despite
statutory restrictions that would seem to go against General
Motors’ position.
1. The Clinton Administration’s Check-the-Box
Regulations
Since 1924, federal tax law has defined the term “corpora-
tion” as “includ[ing] associations, joint-stock companies, and
insurance companies.”276  While that definition is somewhat
Delphic, the Supreme Court shed light on the scope of the term
“corporation” in the 1935 case Morrissey v. Commissioner.277
The “salient features” of a corporation, according to Morrissey,
are (1) perpetual life, (2) centralized management, (3) free
transferability of beneficial interests “without affecting the con-
tinuity of the enterprise,” and (4) limited liability for owners.278
272 See supra text accompanying notes 217–219. R
273 See supra text accompanying notes 141–147. R
274 See supra text accompanying note 110. R
275 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
276 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (2012).
277 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
278 Id.; see Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84
B.U. L. REV. 185, 216 (2004).  Note that Polsky’s article preceded two Supreme
Court decisions that likely place the Treasury’s actions on firmer ground.  The
first, National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,
held that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
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A quarter century after Morrissey, the Treasury Department
under President Eisenhower promulgated regulations codifying
the Morrissey factors.279  This test governed for the next three-
dozen years.
In 1996, however, the Clinton administration announced a
dramatic change to the decades-old regime.  The Treasury De-
partment promulgated regulations allowing unincorporated
business entities other than publicly traded enterprises to elect
whether or not they will be taxed as corporations.  Some foreign
business entities are treated as “per se corporations” under
check-the-box, but a wide variety of foreign entities enjoy free-
dom of choice.280
Several commentators have questioned the Treasury’s au-
thority to promulgate the check-the-box rules.281  The Su-
preme Court has held that “[o]nce we have determined a
statute’s meaning,” that interpretation becomes “settled law,”
and agencies are no longer entitled to deference if they adopt a
conflicting interpretation of the same provision.282 Morrissey,
moreover, interpreted the meaning of the term “corporation” for
purposes of the tax statutes; that interpretation would now
seem to be “settled law.”283  Two courts of appeals, though,
have held that the check-the-box regulations do not contravene
Morrissey,284 largely laying the issue to rest.  But valid or not,
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court deci-
sion holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the stat-
ute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”  545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
Then in 2011, the Court clarified in Mayo that the Chevron framework applies to
Treasury regulations. See supra subpart I.C.  The combination of holdings would
seem to suggest that the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of the tax code in
Morrissey and INDOPCO can be trumped by subsequent Treasury pronounce-
ments.  The argument in text here, though, is not that the check-the-box and
INDOPCO regulations are illegal.  Rather, the argument is that at the time they
were issued these regulations represented much more robust assertions of execu-
tive authority than is typical in the revenue-raising context.
279 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409.  The 1960 regulations stated that an enter-
prise would only be treated as a corporation if it exhibited at least three of the four
corporate factors.  On whether the 1960 regulations are themselves consistent
with Morrissey, see Polsky, supra note 278, at 217–18. R
280 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,585–86 (Dec. 18, 1996).  Foreign entities that
provide limited liability for their owners are treated as corporations by default but
can opt out of corporation status.
281 Compare Polsky, supra note 278 (arguing that the regulations exceeded R
Treasury’s authority), with Victor E. Fleischer, Note, “If It Looks like a Duck”:
Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 518 (1996) (arguing the opposite).
282 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996).
283 Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
284 See McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100, 104–09 (2d Cir.
2007); Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2007).
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the check-the-box regulations certainly represent a robust ex-
ercise of executive authority.  In this regard, they stand in stark
contrast to the modus operandi of past Presidents with respect
to revenue-raising measures.
2. The Bush Administration’s INDOPCO Regulations
The Supreme Court’s INDOPCO decision construed Code
provisions relating to the deductibility of business expenses.285
In INDOPCO itself, a corporation formerly known as National
Starch claimed deductions for fees paid to investment bankers
and lawyers in connection with a friendly takeover of National
Starch by Unilever.286  The Supreme Court ruled that the fees
were capital expenditures rather than immediately deductible
business expenses.  The Court’s narrow holding was that ex-
penses “incurred for the purpose of changing the corporate
structure for the benefit of future operations” must be capital-
ized;287 the broader implication of the INDOPCO decision was
that taxpayers must capitalize expenditures made for the “bet-
terment” of the their business over a period of time “somewhat
longer than the current taxable year.”288
In 2004, a dozen years after INDOPCO, the Bush Treasury
Department promulgated final regulations addressing the de-
ductibility of amounts paid to create or acquire intangibles.289
In several respects, the regulations deviated from the INDOPCO
decision in a “taxpayer-favorable” direction.290  For example,
the regulations generally allow a taxpayer to immediately de-
duct amounts paid to create or acquire nonfinancial interests
with a useful life of twelve months or less, even if the twelve-
month period extends over two taxable years.291  The twelve-
month rule opens the door to planning opportunities that were
well recognized even at the time of the regulations.292
285 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 83–87 (1992); see I.R.C. § 162(a)
(2012) (“[Deduction for] ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.”); I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (2012)
(providing no deduction for “[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for perma-
nent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or
estate”).
286 INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79–81, 88.
287 Id. at 89 (quoting Gen. Bancshares Corp. v. Comm’r, 326 F.3d 712, 715
(8th Cir. 1964)).
288 Id. at 90 (quoting Gen. Bancshares Corp., 326 F.3d at 715).
289 T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B. 447.
290 Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, TAX ANALYSTS, Oct. 25, 2004,
at 435–36.
291 See T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B. 447, 451.
292 See generally Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed IN-
DOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 TAX NOTES 1381, 1381 (2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 60 20-MAR-17 15:29
692 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:633
Just as the 1996 check-the-box regulations raised the
question of whether the Treasury could effectively overrule Mor-
rissey, the 2004 regulations raised the question of whether the
Treasury could effectively overrule INDOPCO.293  Since the reg-
ulations are generally taxpayer-friendly, few potential litigants
would have standing to challenge the validity of the 2004
rules.294  The point here, though, is not to question the validity
of the INDOPCO regulations; it is to note the asymmetry with
respect to revenue-raising and revenue-reducing regulations.
Over the course of several administrations, the President and
his Treasury Department have sought congressional support
for revenue-raising measures while adopting taxpayer-friendly
regulations on their own (even when those taxpayer-friendly
regulations require relatively bold assertions of executive
power).
3. The Obama Administration’s General Motors Decision
As a general rule, a company that incurs a net operating
loss (NOL) in one year can claim that loss as a deduction from
taxable income in a future year.  Section 172 of the Code allows
for NOL carryforwards over twenty years and NOL carrybacks
over two years: that is, a taxpayer with a net operating loss in
2016 can use that loss to reduce its tax for 2014 or 2015 or for
any year through 2036.295  Section 382, however, limits the
ability of a corporation to use NOLs following an ownership
change.  Most relevantly for present purposes, section 382(l)(5)
applies when a corporation with NOLs goes through bank-
ruptcy and the shareholders and creditors of the old corpora-
tion own at least 50% of the stock of the reorganized
corporation.296  Under those circumstances, the new corpora-
tion can use the old corporation’s NOLs, provided that the new
corporation does not undergo another “ownership change” in
the next two years.  If, however, the new corporation undergoes
an ownership change in the two years following the bankruptcy
reorganization, it loses all of its NOLs.297  The definition of
“ownership change” is somewhat complicated, but such a
change will occur if one or more large shareholders (i.e., share-
holders with more than 5% of the corporation’s stock) sell more
than 50% of the corporation’s stock over the next two years.298
293 See Polsky, supra note 278, at 243–44. R
294 See id. at 244 n.347, 245.
295 I.R.C. § 172(a), (b)(1)(A) (2012).
296 See I.R.C. § 382(l)(5)(A) (2012).
297 See § 382(l)(5)(D).
298 See § 382(g).
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In October 2008, Congress passed and President Bush
signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which pro-
vided the Treasury with authority to carry out the Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP).299  In June of the following year,
General Motors filed for bankruptcy protection in federal court.
By that point, the U.S. Treasury was GM’s primary creditor,
having acquired nearly $50 billion in GM senior debt through
TARP.  The bankruptcy court quickly approved a sale of GM’s
assets to a new corporation in which the U.S. Treasury would
hold a 61% stake.  The Canadian government would hold a
12% stake in the new corporation; the United Auto Workers
would, through a trust, hold a 17.5% stake; and other un-
secured creditors would hold the remaining stock in the new
corporation.  Because creditors of the old GM held at least half
(indeed, all) of the stock in the new GM, section 382(l)(5) al-
lowed the new GM to use the old GM’s $45 billion in NOLs.300
There was, however, one potential wrench in the plan: if
the Treasury sold its stock in GM in the next two years—or if
the Treasury sold some of its stock and other owners of the new
GM sold their stock such that an “ownership change” oc-
curred—the new GM would lose all of its NOLs.  And, indeed,
the Treasury had every intention to sell its stake expedi-
tiously.301  The Treasury addressed this potential problem in
January 2010 by issuing Notice 2010-2, which said that for
stock and other financial instruments acquired by the Treasury
through TARP, any subsequent sale by the Treasury would not
trigger an “ownership change” under section 382.302  With the
swoop of a pen, GM’s section 382 problem went away.
Notice 2010-2 cited three sources of statutory authority.
First, section 382(m) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “pre-
scribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
carry out the purposes of this section.”303  Second, section
299 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008).
300 J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own
Companies from Tax?  The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON
PUB. POL’Y 1, 7–9 (2011).
301 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. to Sell Off Its Remaining GM Shares, WASH.
POST (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-
to-sell-off-500-million-remaining-gm-shares/2012/12/19/6dfc345e-49fd-11e2-
b6f0-e851e741d196_story.html [https://perma.cc/H8K5-XQK3] (quoting Assis-
tant Secretary of Treasury for Financial Stability Timothy Massad as saying that
“[t]he government should not be in the business of owning stakes in private
companies for an indefinite period of time”).
302 I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251.
303 I.R.C. § 382(m) (2012).
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7805(a) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.304  Third, section 101(c)(5) of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act gives the Treasury Secretary the
power to “issu[e] such regulations and other guidance as may
be necessary or appropriate to define terms or carry out the
authorities or purposes of this Act.”305  One can question
whether these general grants of regulatory authority are suffi-
cient to justify Notice 2010-2, though I will leave that debate to
others.306  What seems clear is that the statutory delegations
cited by the Treasury in Notice 2010-2 are no more specific
(and indeed, much less so) than the provisions that the Trea-
sury might cite as authority for regulations addressing carried
interest,307 lower-of-cost-or-market accounting,308 and gran-
tor-retained annuity trusts309—all of which are cases in which
the statutory grant of authority is quite explicit.  Put differently,
one might argue that the Treasury lacked the statutory author-
ity to promulgate Notice 2010-2, but if one thinks that the
Treasury did have the statutory authority to promulgate Notice
2010-2 (as the Obama administration claims it did), then the
Treasury certainly has the authority to implement most of the
revenue-raising measures listed in subpart I.E through execu-
tive action.310
What is especially remarkable about Notice 2010-2 is how
clearly it contravened the expressed wishes of members of the
then-current Congress.  In the midst of the fall 2008 financial
crisis, the Bush Treasury Department issued a similar notice—
Notice 2008-83—that effectively exempted the banking indus-
try from the section 382 limitations.311  Notice 2008-83, unlike
the Obama administration’s subsequent action addressing
GM, asserted absolutely no statutory authority for such an
exemption.  The Washington Post quoted former Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation Chief of Staff George Yin as saying: “Did the
304 See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
305 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343,
§ 101(c)(5), 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
306 See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 300, at 7–9; Lawrence Zelenak, R
Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J.
829, 846–47 (2012).
307 See supra text accompanying notes 111–112. R
308 See supra text accompanying note 154. R
309 See supra text accompanying notes 155–157. R
310 The Treasury separately took actions ensuring that Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and AIG would not lose NOLs as a result of financial
crisis bailouts. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 300, at 20–21. R
311 See I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905.
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Treasury Department have the authority to do this?  I think
almost every tax expert would agree that the answer is no.”312
But while the legal basis for Notice 2008-83 was dubious, the
intention behind Notice 2008-83 was unambiguous: the Trea-
sury wanted to attract a buyer for Wachovia, then the fourth-
largest bank holding company in the country, which was on the
brink of collapse.313  And it worked: three days after the notice,
Wells Fargo stepped in to buy Wachovia and its built-in
NOLs.314
The reaction from Congress was almost as rapid.  Republi-
can Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa called for the Treasury
Inspector General to investigate the “facts and circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the Notice.”315  Democratic Sena-
tor Charles Schumer of New York also wrote to Treasury offi-
cials expressing concerns about the action.316  Then in
February of the following year, Congress passed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included a pro-
vision stating:
Congress finds as follows:
(1) The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury under section 382(m) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 does not authorize the Secretary to provide exemp-
tions or special rules that are restricted to particular indus-
tries or classes of taxpayers.
(2) Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsis-
tent with the congressional intent in enacting such section
382(m).
312 Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/09/
AR2008110902155_pf.html [https://perma.cc/MK3H-G5BJ].
313 See Memorandum from Richard Delmar, Counsel to the Inspector Gen., to
Eric M. Thorson, Inspector Gen. 3 (Sept. 3, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/Inquiry%20Regarding%20IRS%
20Notice%202008-83.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2CL-43A4] (“[T]ax rules should not
be obstacles to financial transactions and acquisitions that were otherwise good
for the economy.”).
314 See Binyamin Applebaum, After Change in Tax Law, Wells Fargo Swoops
In, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2008/10/03/AR2008100301042.html [https://perma.cc/XZ9U-
GENZ].
315 Michael Scherer, The Silent Change to Section 382, TIME (Nov. 15, 2008),
http://swampland.time.com/2008/11/15/the-silent-change-to-section-382
[https://perma.cc/6UZU-XP9M].
316 Letter from Senator Chuck Schumer to Sec’y Henry Paulson, Dep’t of the
Treasury, and Doug Shulman, IRS Comm’r (Oct. 30, 2008), http://bit.ly/
1O2U4gm [https://perma.cc/U5JL-56XS].
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(3) The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Notice 2008-83 is doubtful.317
Acknowledging that “taxpayers should generally be able to
rely on guidance issued by the Secretary of the Treasury,” Con-
gress declared that Notice 2008-83 would “have the force and
effect of law with respect to any ownership change . . . occur-
ring on or before January 16, 2009, and . . . shall have no force
or effect with respect to any ownership change . . . after such
date.”318  Nonetheless, Notice 2010-2 extended the exemption
from the section 382 limits to the GM transaction occurring
four months after the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act became law.  Whether or not Notice 2012-2 technically
runs afoul of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the
contrast with revenue-raising regulations could not be starker.
Consider the example of Notice 98-11 above (the Clinton ad-
ministration proposal to walk back check-the-box with respect
to hybrid branches).319  In the Notice 98-11 case, the Treasury
withdrew a proposed revenue-raising regulation for which it
had virtually uncontested statutory authority based on
murmurs of congressional disapproval.320  In the Notice 2010-
2 case, the Treasury went forward with a taxpayer-friendly reg-
ulatory action for which it had questionable authority notwith-
standing shouts from Capitol Hill.  To be sure, the financial
crisis catalyzed (and perhaps justified) extraordinary mea-
sures.  But the fact remains that the Treasury has been willing
to test the outer limits of its authority in one direction and not
the other.
II
GAME THEORY, DEFICIT HAWKS, AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
Part I set forth the puzzle: Why does the President repeat-
edly ask Congress to enact revenue-raising measures that the
executive branch already has the power to implement on its
own—especially when it is clear that Congress will rebuff the
President’s request?  One potential answer is that statutes are
more durable than regulations: regulations are easily reversible
by the next administration (especially after the Brand X deci-
sion321) while the process of repealing a statute is considerably
317 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1261(a), 123 Stat. 115, 342–43 (2009).
318 § 1261(a)(4)–(b)(1).
319 See supra text accompanying notes 133–138. R
320 See supra text accompanying notes 133–138. R
321 See supra note 74. R
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more cumbersome.  So too, statutes are less likely to be over-
turned on judicial review than regulations: a regulation, after
all, can be set aside if it is inconsistent with the authorizing
statute, whereas a statute need only satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution.  Also, a President who acts unilaterally may
face charges of presidential imperialism from the press and
other thought leaders.322  While this last constraint has not
prevented Presidents in recent years from engaging in robust
exercises of executive authority, it may make legislation a first-
best option and unilateralism a second-best response to legis-
lative gridlock.
The puzzle, then, is not why the President initially asks
Congress to enact revenue-raising measures via legislation: in
light of the considerations listed in the previous paragraph, the
President’s preference for legislation over executive action
might seem overdetermined.  Rather, the puzzle is why the
President fails to act after Congress already has rebuffed his
requests.  I do not claim to have found a single answer to the
puzzle, and I doubt that a single answer exists.  Instead, this
Part proposes three explanations and explores the implications
of each.  The three explanations, I argue, bring us closer to
understanding patterns of presidential action and inaction in
tax law.  They do not, however, constitute a complete answer.
Before proceeding further, a caveat is in order: the analysis
below generally treats the President, the Treasury, and the IRS
as an undifferentiated whole.  Of course, the executive
branch—like Congress—is a they, not an it.323  IRS officials
may have preferences that diverge from those of their counter-
parts at the Treasury Office of Tax Policy, and the top tax offi-
cials at the Treasury may, in turn, have preferences that
diverge from the President’s.  Why, then, treat the executive
branch as the functional unit of analysis?  First, the organiza-
tional structure of the Treasury Department (including the IRS,
a bureau within the Treasury) is both an independent and
dependent variable.  The regulation drafting process within the
Treasury may generate frictions that make it more difficult for
the executive branch to take on a robust revenue-raising role,
but at the same time, if the President had a strong interest in
322 See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Opinion, The Making of an Imperial President, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/opinion/sunday/
ross-douthat-the-making-of-an-imperial-president.html [https://perma.cc/
G7GP-9CRM] (characterizing President Obama’s tenure as an “imperial
presidency”).
323 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240–42 (1992).
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the Treasury taking on a robust revenue-raising role, the regu-
lation drafting process within the Treasury might be much
more streamlined.  Analyzing the incentives of the President is
a first step toward understanding why the Treasury and the
IRS are structured as they are.  Second, and as noted above,
simplification can allow us to see potential relationships upon
multiple variables in a complex environment.324  Whether it
does so here is a judgment I leave to the reader.
A. Taxation Across Two Branches: A Game-Theoretic
Approach
This section uses public choice and game theory to gener-
ate a possible explanation to the puzzle presented in Part I.
Section II.A.1 presents a simple model of presidential behavior.
Section II.A.2 develops a game-theoretic framework for analyz-
ing interactions between the President and Congress.  Section
II.A.3 incorporates ideological and doctrinal factors into the
game-theoretic framework.
1. A Simple Model of Presidential Behavior
No single formula can capture all of the reasons why Presi-
dents and members of Congress do what they do.  But a ser-
viceable first approximation is that politicians take actions for
which the expected political benefits (B) exceed the expected
political costs (C).  The beneficiaries of regulation can reward a
politician through votes, campaign contributions, political fa-
vors, and employment opportunities after the politician leaves
office.  The interests harmed by regulation channel votes, con-
tributions, and favors to the politician’s opponent.  To be sure,
this first approximation is just that—an approximation: politi-
cians also act for reasons unrelated to a political cost-benefit
calculus.325  Yet even though not everyone in a position of
power acts like Frank Underwood,326 the basic model provides
a useful set of analytical building blocks even if it does not
describe every element of reality.
As noted above, in many circumstances Presidents have a
choice between acting on their own and proposing legislation to
Congress.  When the President and Congress act jointly, voters
may apportion credit and blame between the two branches.  Let
p represent the portion of credit (blame) for legislation that
324 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
325 See generally JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 1–21 (Harper Perennial
Modern Classics, 1st ed., 2006) (1956).
326 See HOUSE OF CARDS (Netflix 2013–2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN303.txt unknown Seq: 67 20-MAR-17 15:29
2017] THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO TAX 699
voters assign to the President, with 1-p representing the por-
tion of credit (blame) for legislation that voters assign to Con-
gress.  Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are no veto
overrides: any legislation passed by Congress must be signed
by the President in order to become law.327
The introduction of a second branch does not (yet) alter the
analysis significantly.  If the President were the sole political
actor, he would adopt regulations for which B > C.  If he has to
share credit and blame with Congress, he will support mea-
sures for which pB > pC.  The set of regulations for which B > C
is identical to the set of measures for which pB > pC.  So long as
the President’s proportion of credit is the same as his propor-
tion of blame, then every regulation that he would support in
the one-branch scenario is also a measure he will support in a
two-branch world.
What about revenue-raising measures?  I will assume for
now that the only political benefit of raising revenue is the
benefit that comes from spending that revenue.  There may be
cases in which voters affirmatively want other taxpayers to pay
more;328 for now, my focus will be on the majority of cases
where revenue-raising measures yield only political costs and
expenditures yield only political benefits.  I will also assume
that voters and interest groups assign blame for revenue-rais-
ing measures to the political actors who enacted those mea-
sures, and will assign credit for expenditures to the political
actors who approved the spending.  So when the President
takes executive action that results in more revenue being
327 As previously noted, veto overrides with respect to tax legislation are ex-
ceedingly rare. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. R
328 One might think that earnings stripping—see supra section I.E.2—would
be one such case: Democrats and Republicans alike have criticized U.S. corpora-
tions that merge with foreign counterparts in an attempt to escape out from under
the U.S. tax system. See, e.g., Kevin Drawbaugh & Emily Stephenson, Politicians
Slam Tax-Avoiding Pfizer-Allergan Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.reut
ers.com/article/us-allergan-m-a-pfizer-whitehouse-idUSKBN0TC24820151124
[https://perma.cc/X2L3-DQUG] (reporting statements by presidential candidates
criticizing Pfizer’s planner merger with Allergan); Carolyn Y. Johnson & Renae
Merle, Pfizer’s Tax-Avoiding Megamerger with Allergan Sparks Outcry, WASH. POST
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pfizers-
tax-avoiding-megamerger-with-allergan-sparks-outcry/2015/11/23/cced417c-
9218-11e5-b5e4-279b4501e8a6_story.html [https://perma.cc/S5DZ-PAWN]
(quoting Senate Minority Leader Harry M. Reid’s complaint that “[b]y nominally
moving overseas while continuing to take all the benefits of a U.S. company, Pfizer
is gaming the system and will avoid paying its fair share of U.S. tax dollars”).
Note, though, that the Obama administration has not used the full measure of its
executive power to crack down on earnings stripping by inverted firms.  Perhaps
this suggests that the earnings stripping case is not as exceptional as it initially
appears.
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raised, he bears all the political costs himself.  However, he
cannot spend the funds himself; spending measures must go
through Congress.  Thus, the President internalizes all the po-
litical costs, C, but only a portion of the political benefits, pB.
The model so far has incorporated assumptions that are
concededly contestable.  First, it assumes that voters and in-
terest groups are sufficiently well informed that they know
whether it was the President and Congress who raised their
taxes or the President who did so on his own.  This assumption
may appear implausible as applied to the general mass of vot-
ers, who may have difficulty determining whether the President
or Congress is responsible for a particular policy change.329
But the assumption is more viable with respect to some of the
interest groups that benefit from specific features of the tax
laws.  For example, private equity managers who benefit from
the taxation of carried interest profits at preferential rates have
spent millions of dollars on sophisticated lobbying efforts and
campaign contributions targeted at specific members of Con-
gress and presidential candidates.330  The same is true for the
multinational firms that benefit from check-the-box treatment
of single-member foreign-incorporated entities.331  If the
Obama administration took executive action to eliminate these
features of the tax code, it is difficult to imagine that private
equity managers and Fortune 500 CEOs would be confused as
to whether the President or Congress was to blame.
329 On political ignorance, see generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–105 (1996)
(“We now draw on the constructivist approach . . . to provice . . . what Americans
know—and don’t know—about politics.”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Con-
stitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1308 tbl.1 (2004) (assessing political
ignorance of Americans through survey evidence).  For example, only 55% of U.S.
adults (though perhaps a higher percentage of voters) knew that Republicans had
a majority in the House of Representatives before the 2000 election. See id.
330 See, e.g., Alec MacGillis, The Billionaires’ Loophole, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14,
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/david-rubenstein-
and-the-carried-interest-dilemma [https://perma.cc/7JP4-2SVB] (“[T]he so-
called carried interest tax loophole . . . [a] tax break [that] has helped private
equity become one of the most lucrative sectors of the financial industry.”); Private
Equity & Investment Firms, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.open-
secrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=F2600 [https://perma.cc/9JXL-7AWU].
331 See, e.g., Kevin Drawbaugh & Andy Sullivan, Insight: How Treasury’s Tax
Loophole Mistake Saves Companies Billions Each Year, REUTERS (May 20, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-checkthebox-insight-idUSBRE94T1
7K20130531 [https://perma.cc/3MKH-UTS6] (“The ‘check the box’ loophole—
which costs the United States about $10 billion per year, according to the White
House—also has been a reflection of Washington’s ‘revolving door’ culture of
policy-making and lobbying.”).
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At the same time, the model assumes that voters and/or
interest groups are not so sophisticated that they can attribute
the credit for expenditures to the actor who facilitated those
expenditures through revenue-raising measures.  This as-
sumption strikes me as quite plausible even as applied to the
most sophisticated interest groups.  It is virtually impossible to
know where the marginal dollar in the federal budget goes.
(What would Congress cut if it had $1 less—or even $10 billion
less?)  It is doubtful that members of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees can answer that question—much
less that anyone outside the Capitol office buildings can.  For
that reason, it seems unlikely that the beneficiary of a particu-
lar spending program will recognize that the money for that
program came from a specific revenue-raising executive action.
More plausibly, the beneficiary of the spending program will
assign credit to the lawmakers who passed—and the President
who signed—the spending measure.
Subject to these assumptions, the model generates a first-
cut solution to the puzzle in Part I.  The President will include a
proposal in the Greenbook if pB > pC, which is to say, when B >
C.  In other words, the President will include a revenue-raising
proposal in the Greenbook if the political benefits from addi-
tional spending (benefits he shares with Congress) offset the
political costs from additional taxation (costs he also shares
with Congress).  By contrast, the President will act unilaterally
to raise revenue only if pB > C—only if the shared political
benefits from additional spending offset the political costs from
additional taxation that the President must bear on his own.
This suggests that there exists a set of revenue-raising propos-
als that the President is willing to include in the Greenbook but
unwilling to pursue on his own: those for which pC < pB < C.
With respect to revenue-reducing measures, the model
generates an opposite result.  Assume that voters appreciate
actions that reduce their own tax burden; the only political cost
of such measures is that they leave less revenue to be spent.  If
the President acts unilaterally to reduce revenue, the political
benefits, B, are all his, and the political costs of corresponding
spending cuts are shared with Congress.  This suggests that
there exists a set of revenue-reducing measures that the Presi-
dent would be willing to enact on his own but not if he has to
share the credit with Congress: those for which pB < pC < B.
One might think that the dynamics of tax lawmaking
would change as a President approaches the end of his second
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term in office.332  And indeed, the Treasury Department issued
a series of revenue-raising “midnight regulations” in the last
days before President Clinton left the White House.  These mid-
night regulations included: regulations placing limits on the
availability of the research and experimentation tax credit333
(which were then suspended by the administration of George
W. Bush after it took office334); regulations designed to prevent
avoidance of rules regarding long-term contracts;335 regula-
tions aimed at stopping “abusive transactions” involving chari-
table remainder trusts;336 regulations extending an anti-abuse
rule to rental agreements involving payments of $2 million or
less;337 and regulations restricting the permissible terms for
lifetime charitable lead trusts.338  Even so, there are reasons
why a President might be reluctant to act in his waning days in
office.  For one, an outgoing President will not be around to
share in the political benefits from additional spending; thus,
both terms in the President’s cost-benefit calculus are reduced
in the administration’s last days.  And perhaps more signifi-
cantly, a President who is being followed by a member of the
opposite party may worry that midnight revenue-raising regu-
lations will allow his successor to score easy political points:
the successor can rescind or suspend the midnight regulation
(as President Bush did with respect to Clinton’s R&E rule) and
reap all the political benefits that follow.
For most of 2016, the smart money was on the President’s
party retaining the White House339 (wrong though the smart
money turned out to be).  Perhaps the Obama administration’s
more robust exercise of executive authority in a revenue-rais-
ing direction in mid-2016 can be attributed to this expectation:
the administration might have been clearing the regulatory
332 On midnight rulemaking generally, see Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political
Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94
VA. L. REV. 889, 956–58 (2008).  O’Connell finds a significant uptick in rulemak-
ing activity in a President’s final year in office, see id. at 956 tbl.4, although it is
difficult to know whether this is because the incentives of regulators shift in the
final year, or because outgoing administration officials are racing to complete
multiyear projects before they leave office.
333 66 Fed. Reg. 280 (Jan. 3, 2001).
334 See, e.g., Robert McIntyre, The Taxonomist, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 3, 2002),
http://prospect.org/article/taxonomist-36 [https://perma.cc/LGQ3-FNDZ] (not-
ing that President Bush implemented the research and experimentation “tax-
giveaway scheme” by administrative fiat).
335 66 Fed. Reg. 2,219 (Jan. 11, 2001).
336 66 Fed. Reg. 1,034 (Jan. 5, 2001).
337 66 Fed. Reg. 1,038 (Jan. 5, 2001).
338 66 Fed. Reg. 1,040 (Jan. 5, 2001).
339 See supra note 255. R
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brush so that the next Democratic President could avoid the
political costs of doing so.  It should be emphasized, however,
that at no point in the modern era has a President who gener-
ally supported higher taxes handed off power to a successor of
the same political party, so analogies are hard to come by.340
(And, of course, the expectation that a generally pro-tax Presi-
dent would be succeeded by someone of his own party was not
realized this time either.)
Even though the model above is only rudimentary, it al-
ready sheds some light on the puzzle in Part I.  On the one
hand, the President may be willing to include revenue-raising
proposals in the Greenbook but not to implement those pro-
posals unilaterally because the political costs are too steep if he
must bear those costs all on his own.  On the other hand, the
President may be quite willing to pursue revenue-reducing
measures on his own: indeed, in some circumstances he may
be willing to implement revenue-reducing measures via execu-
tive action even though he would not want the measure in-
cluded in the Greenbook.  Notably, the simple model does not
suggest that the set of revenue-raising executive actions will be
null: the President still may be willing to act on his own when
pB > C.  But while the basic model sheds light on the Presi-
dent’s incentives, it fails to capture the strategic interactions
between the President and Congress.  The next section takes
up that task.
2. The Strategic Model
With respect to revenue-raising measures, the model has
identified a set of proposals that the President will choose to
include in the Greenbook but is not willing to implement on his
own.  Yet the President’s decision to include a proposal in the
Greenbook is not the end of the story; it is his opening bid in
bargaining with Congress.  According to the model, the Presi-
dent will include a proposal in the Greenbook if pC < pB < C,
and will not include a proposal in the Greenbook if B < C.
When pB > C, though, the analysis is more complicated.
The complication arises from the fact that even if pB > C, it
is still the case that C > pC.  In other words, even if the shared
340 The last time a living Democratic President handed off power to a Demo-
cratic successor was in 1857, before there was a federal income tax.  Republican
President William Howard Taft supported the ratification of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment and Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower held views about taxation
that would be anathema to Republicans today, but both were succeeded by Presi-
dents of the rival party.
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political benefits of additional spending are high enough that
the President would be willing to bear the political costs of
raising revenue on his own, he would still prefer to share those
costs with Congress.  As a result, the President may include
proposals in the Greenbook even though—if the prospect of
legislation were off the table—the President would be willing to
implement the proposal via executive action.
After Congress receives the Greenbook, it decides whether
to adopt the President’s proposal.  (Of course, just as the exec-
utive branch is not a unitary actor, Congress is not of one mind
either; for now, imagine a unified congressional leadership call-
ing the legislative shots, though this assumption will be relaxed
later on.)  One might think that if the leadership in Congress
shares the President’s preferences (or shares his estimate of
political costs and benefits), then Congress would adopt every
proposal in the Greenbook.  The outcome might change,
though, if the leaders of Congress have political fortunes sepa-
rate from the President.  This is because the congressional
leadership knows that the President may include some propos-
als in the Greenbook for which pB > C.  (With perfect informa-
tion, the leaders of Congress will be able to identify the
proposals that fall into this set.)  While the President would
prefer to share political costs with Congress, the leaders of
Congress would prefer that the President bear those costs
himself.
How might we imagine this interaction playing out?  The
payoffs to the President and Congress resemble the well-known
“hawk-dove” game.341  If the President does not regulate and
Congress does not legislate, then the payoff is zero to both
sides.  If the President does not regulate and Congress does
legislate (with the President signing the legislation into law),
then the payoff to the President is p(B – C) and the payoff to
Congress is (1 – p)(B – C).  In other words, the President and
Congress share both the benefits and the costs.  And if the
President regulates while Congress does not legislate, then the
payoff to the President is pB – C while the payoff to Congress is
(1 – p)B.  That is, the President and Congress share the bene-
fits, but the President bears all the costs.  Figure 1 summarizes
the analysis thus far.  Note that the model excludes the possi-
341 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 303–04 (1994);
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game The-
ory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 223–24 (2009).  The hawk-dove game is
sometimes referred to as the game of “chicken.” See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER, ECO-
NOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSITY 227 (1987).
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bility of unilateral congressional action: my assumption is that
the President will never veto a revenue-raising proposal that he
already has included in his own Greenbook.  (Indeed, there do
not appear to be any historical examples of such a veto.)
FIGURE 1. HAWK-DOVE GAME WITH ONE MISSING BOX
 Don’t Legislate Legislate 
Don’t Regulate 0, 0 pB - pC, (1 - p)(B - C) 
Regulate pB - C, (1 - p)B -- 
Three points about Figure 1 are worth noting.  First, the
upper left box (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) is the worst of all
worlds for both players.  The President would prefer to regulate
than to end up in the upper left box, even though that means
he would bear all the political costs of revenue raising himself.
And Congress, for its part, would prefer to legislate than to end
up in the upper left box, even though that would mean it shares
a portion of the political costs.  Second, the President would
prefer to end up in the upper right box (don’t regulate, legislate)
rather than the lower left box (regulate, don’t legislate).  This
should track our intuitions: the President wants to share the
political costs of revenue raising with Congress if he can.
Third, and reciprocally, Congress would prefer to end up in the
lower left box (regulate, don’t legislate) rather than the upper
right box (don’t regulate, legislate).  Again, this should be intui-
tive: Congress would prefer for the President to bear all the
political costs of revenue raising rather than having those costs
shared across branches.
What goes in the fourth box?  What would it mean for the
President to regulate and Congress to legislate?  In theory,
Congress could ratify a Treasury regulation by incorporating
the regulatory language into a statute.  However, once the Trea-
sury Department has already promulgated a revenue-raising
regulation, what incentive would Congress have to incur the
political costs that come with codification (given that Congress
is already set to share the benefits from the revenue raised)?342
Perhaps a more plausible interpretation of the fourth box is as
follows: When the President includes a proposal in the Green-
book, the President decides whether he is willing to proceed
unilaterally and Congress decides whether it is willing to pro-
342 Perhaps Congress would codify the regulation in order to shield it from
attack in court as ultra vires.  For present purposes, however, I focus on cases in
which the relevant regulatory action lies within the executive branch’s authority.
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ceed legislatively.  If the President decides to regulate and Con-
gress decides to legislate, then the outcome is a tossup as to
who acts first.  The simplest representation of the tossup is to
say that half the time the President acts first and half the time
Congress acts first.  The payoffs in the lower right box, then,
are the averages of the payoffs in the upper right and lower left
boxes.  Thus when the President decides to regulate and Con-
gress decides to legislate, there is a 50% probability that the
President will regulate first—in which case Congress won’t leg-
islate, the President’s payoff will be pB – C, and Congress’s
payoff will be (1 – p)B.  Likewise, there is a 50% probability that
Congress will legislate first—in which case the President won’t
regulate, his payoff will be p(B – C), and Congress’s payoff will
be (1 – p)(B – C).  The terms in the lower right box in Figure 2
represent the averages of these payoffs.
FIGURE 2. HAWK-DOVE GAME WITH ALL FOUR BOXES FILLED IN
 Don’t Legislate Legislate 
Don’t Regulate 0, 0 pB – pC, (1 – p)(B – C) 
Regulate pB – C, (1 – p)B pB – 0.5C – 0.5pC,  
B – pB – 0.5C + 0.5pC 
A game has a Nash equilibrium when there exists a set of
strategies such that each player’s strategy is an optimal re-
sponse to the other player’s strategy.343  (The name honors
John Forbes Nash, Jr., the mathematician and Nobel prize win-
ner of A Beautiful Mind fame.)344  Here, the lower left and upper
right boxes both represent Nash equilibria.  In the lower left
box, Congress never legislates and the President always regu-
lates.  (More precisely, the President unilaterally implements
revenue-raising measures allowable under existing statutes for
which pB > C.)  Conditional on Congress not legislating, the
President has no incentive to change his strategy because his
payoff from (regulate, don’t legislate) is higher than his payoff
from (don’t regulate, don’t legislate).  And conditional on the
President regulating, Congress has no incentive to change its
strategy because its payoff is higher when it does not legislate
than when it does.  Likewise, in the upper right box, the Presi-
dent never regulates and Congress always legislates.  Again,
the President has no incentive to change his strategy as long as
343 See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 11 (1991).
344 See SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (1998); A BEAUTIFUL MIND (Imagine
Entertainment 2001).
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Congress sticks to legislating, and Congress has no incentive to
change its strategy as long as the President does not regulate.
Both of these equilibria are considered “pure strategy” equilib-
ria because they involve each player playing the same strategy
each time.345
We can imagine, then, a lower-left-box world in which Con-
gress never adopts any revenue-raising measure for which pB >
C, and the President always proceeds unilaterally.  We can also
imagine an upper-right-box world in which Congress always
adopts such measures and the President never proceeds on his
own.  Note that in either case, the President never moves uni-
laterally to adopt a measure for which pB < C; if the shared
benefits from additional spending are less than the costs of
acting alone, the President will not act alone.
Even readers unfamiliar with game theory will likely have
an intuition at this point that the two pure strategy Nash equi-
libria are not the only possible outcomes of the hawk-dove
game: the players might mix up their moves from time to time.
And indeed, game theory shows that the players can arrive at a
mixed strategy equilibrium as well.  The mixed strategy equilib-
rium arises when the President’s combination of moves makes
Congress indifferent between legislating and not legislating,
and Congress’s combination of moves makes the President in-
different between regulating and not regulating.  Formally, let r
represent the probability that the President will regulate and let
l (the Greek letter lambda) represent the probability that Con-
gress will legislate; a mixed strategy equilibrium arises
when346:
r =
B − C
B− 0.5C
 
345 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 341, at 313. R
346 The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium arises in the hawk-dove game where
both players are indifferent between their two strategies.  The condition for Con-
gress to be indifferent between don’t legislate and legislate is:
0(1 - r) + [(1 - p)B]r = [(1 - p)(B – C)](1 - r) + [B – pB -  0.5C + 0.5pC]r
This equation can be solved for r with the result that:
r = (B - C)/(B - 0.5C)
The condition for the President to be indifferent between don’t regulate and regu-
late is:
0(1 - l) + (pB - pC)l = (pB - C)(1 - l) + (pB - 0.5C - 0.5pC)l
This equation can be solved for l with the result that:
l = (pB - C)/(pB - 0.5pC - 0.5C)
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What does this mean practically?  The answer depends
critically on the values of the unknown variables.  Say, for ex-
ample, that p = 0.5, B = 2.01, and C = 1.  That is, the President
and Congress share the political benefits and costs of joint
action evenly, and the political costs of raising revenue are
slightly less than half the political benefits of the spending that
it enables.  We can imagine the President and Congress inter-
acting repeatedly with respect to revenue-raising measures
that the President would be willing to adopt if the prospect of
legislative action were off the table and that Congress would be
willing to enact if the prospect of executive action were fore-
closed.  Given the parameter values above, the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium looks like the following: in about 66% of
cases, the President ends up regulating on his own; in 1% of
cases, Congress enacts the measure via legislation; and in the
remaining cases (slightly less than one-third), neither side acts
and the measure goes unimplemented.347
Given that the values of p, B, and C are all unknown, it
would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on any partic-
ular percentage figure.  The more important point is this: Two-
sided inaction may result in the hawk-dove game even in equi-
librium.  Combining this insight with the results of the simple
model at the beginning of the section, we now have two expla-
nations for the puzzle presented in Part I.  Even when the Presi-
dent already has authority under existing statutes to
implement some of his Greenbook proposals via unilateral ac-
tion, the President may fail to do so because:
• The President’s share of the political benefits from the
spending that the revenue raising will allow is greater
than the political costs of revenue raising if those costs
can be shared, but less than the political costs of revenue
raising if he must bear all of those costs himself (pC < pB
< C); or
• The President’s share of the political benefits from the
spending that revenue raising will allow is greater than
347 When p = 0.5, B = 2.01, and C = 1, then r = 0.669 (66.9%) and l = 0.020
(2.0%).  Thus, in 32.44% of cases the outcome is (don’t regulate, don’t legislate); in
0.66% of cases the outcome is (don’t regulate, legislate); in 65.56% of cases the
outcome is (regulate, don’t legislate), and in 1.34% of cases the outcome is (regu-
late, legislate).  When the President decides to regulate and Congress decides to
legislate, it is a tossup as to who acts first: half of the 1.34% of cases end up as
cases of unilateral executive action, and half of the 1.34% of cases end up with
legislation.
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the political costs of revenue raising even if he must bear
all of those costs himself (pB > C), but two-sided inaction
is sometimes the result of a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium solution to the game played by the President and
Congress.348
3. Further Implications of the Hawk-Dove Model
So far the model has made no accommodation for ideology:
it assumes that the President and Congress have the same
ideal point with respect to legislation.  The model also has not
addressed the role of doctrine in constraining or enabling exec-
utive action.  Incorporating ideology and doctrine into the
model yields additional insights into the dynamics of tax
lawmaking.
a. The Role of Ideology
What if the President and Congress assign different values
to B and C?  Such a scenario is likely in an era of divided
government if one party’s political base has a stronger taste for
spending (or distaste for taxation) than the other’s.
Begin with the case in which the President assigns a lower
value to B (or a higher value to C) than Congress does.  This
means that for some set of potential proposals, B > C from
Congress’s perspective but B < C from the President’s point of
view.  In other words, Congress would pass a revenue-raising
measure but the President would not include it in the Green-
book or sign it into law.  Revenue-raising measures of this sort
will not be implemented.
At the same time, the difference between the President’s
and Congress’s cost-benefit assessments also reduces the fre-
quency with which pB > C.  There are fewer revenue-raising
proposals that the President would be willing to implement on
his own.  This narrows the range over which interactions be-
tween the President and Congress resemble the hawk-dove
game.  Knowing that the tax-averse president is unlikely to act
348 We can derive additional insights through comparative statics.  Note that
the (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) outcome arises with probability (1 – r)(1 – l).
Substituting the values for r and l derived above, we arrive at:
0.25C2 (1 – p)
pB2 – 0.5BC – pBC + 0.25C2 + 0.25pC2
As long as pB > C, the probability of a (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) result
decreases over B, increases over C, and decreases over p.  In other words, the
probability of a (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) result is highest when the political
costs of raising revenue are high relative to the political benefits and the President
captures a relatively small share of the benefits.
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on his own, Congress is more likely to adopt a strategy of
legislation.
This analysis suggests that tax aversion on the part of the
President or his political base has an ambiguous effect on the
probability that revenue-raising legislation will be enacted.  On
the one hand, the President’s tax aversion makes him less
likely to include revenue-raising measures in his Greenbook (or
to sign such measures into law).  On the other hand, Con-
gress—knowing that the President is tax-averse—is less likely
to believe that he would be willing to implement revenue-rais-
ing measures on his own.  In sum, the President’s tax aversion
reduces the number of revenue-raising proposals that the Pres-
ident will include in the Greenbook, but increases the
probability that Congress will enact any given revenue-raising
measure that the President does include in the Greenbook.
The reverse scenario is potentially more interesting, as it
more closely describes the state of affairs in Washington from
2011 through the end of 2016.  In this scenario, for a wide
range of revenue-raising measures, B > C from the President’s
perspective but B < C from Congress’s vantage point.  This
scenario would come about if, say, the political costs of reve-
nue-raising measures are very high for the congressional lead-
ership because of a strong anti-tax faction within the majority
party.  Congressional tax aversion will, unsurprisingly, make it
less likely that any revenue-raising legislation will be passed.
Yet that fact may make the President more likely to act unilat-
erally when pB > C.  Recall that in the hawk-dove game, the
President had an incentive to seek congressional support even
for proposals that he would be willing to implement on his own
absent the possibility of legislation.  In effect, congressional tax
aversion removes the possibility of legislation.
A perhaps-ironic implication of this analysis is that the rise
of the anti-tax Tea Party in recent years may actually have led
to more revenue being raised.  This is because a President who
knows that he cannot get any revenue-raising measures
through Congress will implement such measures on his own
whenever pB > C.  The Tea Party, in other words, may have
allowed the President and Congress to avoid the uncooperative
result (don’t regulate, don’t legislate) in the hawk-dove game.
b. The Role of Doctrine
The analysis above assumed that the President has the
legal option of implementing revenue-raising measures via ex-
ecutive action.  The availability of this option, however, de-
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pends on the deference regime.  The option may be off the table
under a less deferential regime (e.g., National Muffler) but avail-
able under a more deferential regime (Chevron).349
One might initially expect that the shift to a more deferen-
tial regime would generally have positive revenue effects.  This
might be so if taxpayer-friendly regulations are likely to go
unchallenged while taxpayer-unfriendly regulations are likely
to be litigated.  In the latter set of cases (the only cases that will
make it to court in substantial numbers), more deference
means it is more likely that the IRS will prevail.  Yet the analy-
sis changes when one considers the dynamic effects of defer-
ence regimes on the shape of tax law.  Recall the observation in
subpart II.B that when pB  > C, an uncooperative outcome
(don’t regulate, don’t legislate) is possible unless the President
can credibly commit not to regulate or Congress can credibly
commit not to legislate.  A zero-deference regime would effec-
tively eliminate the President’s regulatory option, increasing
the probability that Congress would act.
None of this is to say that a less deferential regime always
results in more revenue.  The static and dynamic effects of
deference cut in different directions: deference makes it more
likely that any particular Treasury regulation will pass judicial
muster but less likely that Congress will act to raise revenues.
What we can say is that the Supreme Court’s shift from Na-
tional Muffler to Chevron will not necessarily have a positive
effect on revenue, because freedom of action for the executive
branch may lead to inaction by Congress.
B. The Role of Deficit Hawks
So far the model has assumed an equality of revenues and
expenditures: the possibility of deficit spending has not yet
entered the picture.  Incorporating the possibility of deficit
spending generates additional insights—one of which might
strike some readers as quite counterintuitive.
One way to conceptualize deficit spending is to think of it
as just another form of taxation.  Deficits impose a cost on
future taxpayers, at least some of whom are also current voters
349 Compare Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
(1979) (articulating a multifactor test that the courts must use to determine the
validity of an IRS regulation) with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (holding that the courts must defer to the adminis-
trative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutes).
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(i.e., the relatively young).350  Deficits are also sometimes said
to impose a cost on savers through inflation, though there are
strong theoretical reasons to doubt this claim351 and little em-
pirical evidence to support it.352  Lawmakers and Presidents
who support deficit-financed projects capture political benefits
on the spending side but bear political costs from voters and
interest groups who believe themselves to be adversely affected
by deficits.
What happens if “deficit hawks” constitute a well-organized
interest group?353  (I do not intend the term “deficit hawk” to be
pejorative in any sense—politicians seem to embrace the label
readily.354)  One possibility is that a President can implement a
revenue-raising measure via regulation and advertise the fact
that the measure will lower the deficit: presumably deficit
hawks will give all the political credit for the deficit reduction to
the President.  On the other hand, a President may be reluctant
to take this approach because it will also serve to underscore
his responsibility for the measure in the minds of adversely
affected taxpayers.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, I have found no
example of a President implementing a revenue-raising reform
via regulation and then publicizing it as a deficit-reduction
measure.
The existence of deficit hawks may affect the dynamics of
tax lawmaking through another channel.  In 1990, Congress
adopted the so-called “PAYGO” rule requiring that any spend-
ing that increases the deficit must be offset by measures that
350 See David Romer, What Are the Costs of Excessive Deficits?, 3 NBER
MACROECONOMICS ANN. 63, 108 (1988).
351 See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits, 3 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 37, 49–50 (1989) (noting that the results of empirical studies about
the effects of deficits on saving are “all over the map” because both deficits and
saving have strong cyclical elements).
352 See, e.g., Marco Bassetto & R. Andrew Butters, What Is the Relationship
Between Large Deficits and Inflation in Industrialized Countries?, FED. RES. BANK
OF CHI. ECON. PERSPS.—3RD QUARTER 83, 86–89 (2010) (discussing empirical data
on the relationship between deficits and inflation).
353 The scenario is not entirely hypothetical: Blackstone Group co-founder
Peter Peterson has spent more than a half billion dollars over the last several
years in an effort to draw political attention to debt/deficit concerns. See Alan
Feuer, Peter G. Peterson’s Last Anti-Debt Crusade, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/nyregion/10peterson.html [https://perma.cc/
972S-EC76].
354 See, e.g., Ron Klein, Opinion, Fiscal Responsibility Begins in Washington,
SUN-SENTINEL (Feb. 25, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-02-25/
news/fl-deficit-reduction-klein-forum-20100225_1_fiscal-responsibility-deficit-
budget [https://perma.cc/95XZ-JJ4J] (then-sitting Democratic congressman
telling voters in his district that “[t]hose who know me know that I am a deficit
hawk”).
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raise revenue or reduce other spending by at least the same
amount.355  The PAYGO law lapsed from 2002 until 2010, and
while a version of PAYGO was reenacted in 2010, the new law
applies only to tax cuts and entitlement spending (not to the
“discretionary” items—such as defense, education, transporta-
tion, and economic development—that together make up 32%
of the federal budget).356  PAYGO is not a binding constraint:
Congress can turn it off for any bill at any time (as it did for the
December 2015 package of tax breaks that will add $622 bil-
lion to the national debt).357  And yet bills that violate revenue
neutrality tend to generate at least some political blowback—
especially from fiscally conservative members of the Republi-
can caucus.358  So while the requirement of revenue neutrality
exists only on paper, it remains the case that ceteris paribus,
members of Congress (or at least some of them) would be more
inclined to vote for legislation that is revenue neutral than
legislation that is deficit increasing.
Why might this matter to the President when considering
whether to implement revenue-raising measures unilaterally?
One possibility is that Presidents will “save up” revenue-raising
measures for future negotiations with Congress regarding the
budget.  Administration officials might realize that they could
raise revenues by nearly $10 billion over the next decade
through regulations preventing dual-capacity taxpayers from
claiming foreign tax credits where the relevant foreign country
imposes no general corporate income tax,359 but might decide
355 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Require-
ments in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 510 (1998).
356 See Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat.
8; Ctr. for Budget & Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Introduction to the Federal
Budget, http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-fed-
eral-budget-process [https://perma.cc/ZD68-8UMZ] (last updated Feb. 17,
2016).
357 See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113,
§ 1001, 129 Stat. 2242, Division Q (2015); Mark Bloomfield, Tax Extenders on the
Road to Tax Reform, THE HILL (Dec. 21, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/economy-budget/263889-tax-extenders-on-the-road-to-tax-reform [https:/
/perma.cc/77W8-BMH9]; David M. Herszenhorn, Under Wire, House Passes Big
Package of Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/18/us/politics/house-approves-huge-package-of-tax-breaks.html [https://
perma.cc/F2L8-PULS].
358 See, e.g., Rachel Bade, Congress’ Half-Trillion-Dollar Spending Binge, POLIT-
ICO (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/congress-spend-
ing-binge-tax-cuts-budget-deal-216883 [https://perma.cc/N8LJ-DBZY]
(describing concerns voiced by some House Republicans when Congress passed a
$680 billion tax package that would add to the national debt in December of
2015).
359 See supra section I.E.4.
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that those $10 billion also could be used to (partially) offset the
cost of a tax break or spending provision that the President
favors.  And if the executive branch adopts the revenue-raising
measure unilaterally now, it loses the ability to use the mea-
sure as a chip when bargaining with deficit hawks in Congress
down the line.  The irony is that congressional deficit hawks—
because they are less willing to support measures that add to
the deficit—may deter the President from taking steps that
would raise revenue and reduce the deficit.  PAYGO may be a
double-edged sword.
One possible solution would be to amend the PAYGO law
so as to require the executive branch to keep a running tally of
revenues raised through regulatory action, and then to allow
those revenues to be used as an offset the next time Congress
passes deficit-increasing legislation.  Yet if the objective is over-
all deficit reduction, it is not clear whether such a reform would
bring the budget closer in line with that goal.  After all, the
analysis in subpart II.A does not suggest that the number of
revenue-raising regulations will be zero: a pure strategy equi-
librium of (regulate, don’t legislate) is possible and a mixed
strategy equilibrium in which the President sometimes acts
unilaterally is also possible.  And while the analysis in this
section suggests that the norm of revenue neutrality may some-
times deter the President from acting on his own, it does not
suggest that the shadow of PAYGO will always have that effect.
Allowing for the use of revenues raised by regulation as part of
the PAYGO calculus might motivate the President to act unilat-
erally in some instances that he otherwise might not, but in
other instances the President might have acted even in the
absence of the proposed PAYGO reform.  If, for example, the
President would have implemented the foreign tax credit mea-
sure that raises revenue by $10 billion regardless of PAYGO,
then allowing those $10 billion to offset other tax cuts or direct
spending would simply serve to loosen the PAYGO constraint.
The takeaway, then, is not that PAYGO is a bad idea or that
it ought to be amended.  Rather, the implication is that norms
of revenue neutrality in Congress (binding or not) may have an
as-yet-unrecognized effect on the President’s incentives to act
unilaterally.360  So while the analysis here does not yield a
360 For an example of a recent discussion of PAYGO that ignores this potential
unintended consequence of the law, see Nancy Pelosi, Opinion, Shouldn’t Con-
gress Tell Us How We’ll Pay for Tax Cuts?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/opinion/shouldnt-congress-tell-us-how-well-pay-
for-tax-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/ZZG3-QNDS].
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concrete proposal with respect to revenue neutrality require-
ments, it does serve to shed light on one of PAYGO’s hidden
costs.
C. Cheap Talk
So far, the analysis in this part has assumed that the
Greenbooks reflect the genuine preferences of the President.
The very question “why doesn’t the President use his power to
accomplish X?” assumes that X is an outcome that the Presi-
dent desires.  That assumption is arguably naı¨ve: perhaps
Treasury officials place proposals in the Greenbook with no
intention that those proposals will ever come to fruition.
Yet if this is so, it is difficult to explain what exactly the
executive branch gets out of putting a proposal in the Green-
book.  Perhaps it is a way of mollifying progressives or deficit
hawks without incurring the wrath of interest groups with a
stake in the status quo.  But for that strategy to work, it would
require (1) that pro-tax constituencies are sophisticated
enough to be paying attention to the Greenbook while (2) not
being so sophisticated as to understand that the Greenbook is
cheap talk, while at the same time (3) the interest groups with a
stake in the status quo are sufficiently sophisticated to under-
stand that Greenbook talk is cheap.  This confluence of condi-
tions is perhaps conceivable, but not particularly plausible.
Another sense in which Greenbook proposals might be
“cheap talk” is that they are relatively cheap to write.  That is,
the time and resource costs borne by Treasury and IRS officials
are likely lower with respect to Greenbook proposals than with
respect to regulations that have the force of law.  Since Green-
book proposals are only proposals, the language does not have
to be airtight.  And the Treasury need not go through notice
and comment or observe other procedural niceties with respect
to the Greenbook each year.361  But while Greenbook talk is no
doubt cheaper than regulation writing, the costs of the latter
are not prohibitive.  When a policy goal becomes a top presi-
dential priority, the executive branch is capable of acting expe-
ditiously.362  None of this is to deny that resource constraints
361 To be sure, legislative drafting requires resources as well.  But those costs
potentially can be passed off to Hill staffers at the relevant congressional commit-
tees—the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee,
as well as the lawyers at the Joint Committee on Taxation and the House and
Senate Offices of the Legislative Counsel who assist members of Congress in
drafting statutes.
362 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Midnight Hour, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24, 2008),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/24/midnight-hour [https://per
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play a very real role in the day-to-day operations of the Trea-
sury Department.  But it is to suggest that resource constraints
are endogenous to the political dynamics of tax lawmaking.
CONCLUSION
So far, this Article has argued that the President’s “power
to tax” under existing statutes is broad, but notwithstanding
this power, the President repeatedly asks Congress to pass
revenue-raising measures that he and his Treasury Secretary
could implement on their own.  This Article has presented sev-
eral plausible explanations for presidential inaction in tax law.
These accounts do not, however, tell us whether the President
ought to assert executive authority more robustly in the tax
domain.
The observations above do shed some light on a separate
normative question: whether Congress ought to give the Presi-
dent some authority to set tax rates.  In a recent article, James
Hines and Kyle Logue suggest that delegation of rate-setting
authority “might be normatively attractive.”363  The Hines-
Logue argument for delegation of rate-setting authority resem-
bles arguments for delegation in other areas of law: agencies
“have comparative advantages” relative to Congress “in terms
of expertise and time”;364 delegation gives agencies greater
“flexibility” to respond to changes in the legal environment and
the economy;365 and “the President answers to a majority of the
electorate in a way that no single legislator or even group of
legislators does.”366  The analysis in subpart II.A suggests,
though, that delegation in the tax context might have different
results than in other domains.  Interest group politics push the
ma.cc/64B9-7JKE] (discussing “midnight regulations” promulgated by previous
presidential administrations).
363 James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235,
261 (2015).  Hines and Logue cite work by political scientists David Epstein and
Sharyn O’Halloran suggesting that Congress is less likely to delegate power to the
President in the tax content than in other policy areas. See id. at 237 (citing DAVID
EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 196–203 tbl.8.2 (1999)).  Note,
though, that Epstein and O’Halloran’s results are based on the percentage of
public law provisions in particular areas that delegate discretion to the executive.
Results for tax may be skewed by the fact that a single provision, section 7805,
authorizes the Treasury Secretary to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code].”  I.R.C. § 7805(a).
364 Hines & Logue, supra note 363, at 261. R
365 Id.
366 Id.; cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (making similar arguments
in the non-tax context).
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President to exercise executive power over tax law largely in one
direction: in favor of the taxpayer.  That result may appear to
be positive or negative depending on one’s ideological commit-
ments; at the very least, it makes us doubt whether a President
with even broader delegated authority over tax law would act as
a faithful agent of his congressional principals.
Congress, then, might be well advised to resist calls for
delegation of rate-setting authority to the President.  This does
not mean, though, that the President ought to refrain from
exercising the authority that Congress already has delegated.
As a normative matter, it is difficult to see why the President
ought to be any less willing to exercise his statutory authority
in tax law than in other domains.  Indeed, lawmakers likely
would prefer for the President to exercise that authority—and
to do so in a revenue-raising direction, so that Congress can
share in the political rewards from spending without sharing
the political costs of raising revenue.  Moreover, the fact that
Congress has failed to act on a proposal in the Greenbook does
not imply congressional disapproval of the proposal.  It may
mean, to the contrary, that members of Congress want the
President to implement those policies himself.
Finally, the analysis in this Article identifies two features of
the political environment that decrease the likelihood of unilat-
eral executive action to raise revenue: (1) revenue-raising ac-
tions rarely yield political benefits except insofar as they
facilitate additional spending; and (2) members of Congress are
more likely to support legislation if it is scored as revenue neu-
tral.  The first factor reduces the President’s willingness to act
when that means he will bear the political costs of revenue
raising on his own; the second factor encourages the President
to “save up” revenue-raising measures so that they can be used
as offsets for future expenditures or tax cuts that he supports.
Neither factor is necessarily a permanent feature of the political
landscape.
As for the first factor, 63% of respondents in a recent Gal-
lup poll said that wealth in the United States should be more
evenly distributed, and 52% supported heavy taxes on the rich
as a redistributive mechanism.367  We may be nearing a time
when a President can score political points through revenue-
raising regulations that disproportionately affect large corpora-
tions and wealthy taxpayers.  As for the second factor, concern
367 Frank Newport, Americans Continue to Say U.S. Wealth Distribution Is Un-
fair, GALLUP (May 4, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182987/americans-con-
tinue-say-wealth-distribution-unfair.aspx [https://perma.cc/95T6-D6XG].
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about the deficit appears to be on the decline—both among
members of the public and in the halls of Congress.  Only 11%
of respondents in a recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll
ranked the deficit as a “top priority,” down from 22% four years
earlier.368  Other surveys identify a similar trend.369  And a tax
deal that flunked the revenue neutrality test by a $622 billion
margin nonetheless passed the House and Senate with large
bipartisan majorities at the end of 2015.370  If lawmakers are
unconcerned with revenue neutrality, then the President has
less of an incentive to save up revenue-raising measures for
future bargaining with Congress.  And if legislative gridlock
makes any entitlement expansion or sweeping tax reform pack-
age unlikely, then the President has even less reason to save up
revenue-raising measures for future bargaining with Congress
because such bargaining is unlikely to bear fruit anyway.
These trends help us make sense of the Obama adminis-
tration’s April 2016 actions on corporate inversions.  The sim-
plifying assumption in the game-theoretic model is that the
only political benefit from revenue-raising tax measures comes
through the expenditures enabled by additional revenue but
that simplifying assumption probably does not hold true for the
inversions case.  Cracking down on U.S. corporations that seek
to lower their tax bills by merging with foreign counterparts
quite likely would be a politically popular endeavor,371 even if
the Treasury Department burned the additional cash gener-
ated by its actions.  This is not necessarily a problem with the
model as much as an additional implication: Presidents will be
more willing to take revenue-raising actions unilaterally when
those actions yield political benefits over and above the political
benefits from spending.
The inversions case is consistent with the comparative
statics in Part II in still other ways.  Conditions that make
368 See Janet Hook, Deficit Concern Fades in Congress, Among Voters and on
the 2016 Trail, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2015/12/22/deficit-concern-fades-in-congress-among-voters-and-on-the-2016-
trail [https://perma.cc/9DAK-P22L].
369 See, e.g., Budget Deficit Slips as Public Priority, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 22,
2016), http://www.people-press.org/2016/01/22/budget-deficit-slips-as-pub-
lic-priority [https://perma.cc/V76N-25YS] (reporting results of a Pew Research
Center survey finding that 56% of U.S. adults in 2016 say that the budget deficit
is a “top priority,” down from 64% in 2015).
370 See Hook, supra note 368. R
371 For an unscientific poll showing 71% support for the Obama administra-
tion’s April actions, see Most Support Crackdown on Inversions, ROCHESTER BUS. J.
(Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.rbj.net/article.asp?aID=226042 [https://perma.cc/
FL46-J4YJ].
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executive action more likely were present with respect to inver-
sions.  The congressional leadership was constrained by an
anti-tax faction, which effectively ruled out the (don’t regulate,
legislate) option.  In those circumstances, regulation became
the President’s dominant strategy.  Meanwhile, the low
probability of election year tax reform meant that the PAYGO
deterrent was largely absent: there were no significant entitle-
ment expansions or tax cuts on the horizon that the Obama
administration might want to offset.  The expectation that Pres-
ident Obama would be succeeded by another Democrat also
reduced the risk that revenue-raising executive actions would
be reversed by a successor of the rival party seeking to score
political points.  Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that
the President and his Treasury Secretary chose this time and
this issue for unilateral action.
Does 2016 mark a turning point in the politics of taxation?
The fact that the April 2016 actions were followed by proposed
rules on FLPs four months later might suggest so: as voters
become more concerned about inequality and less so about the
deficit, the political calculus with respect to revenue-raising tax
regulations may change.  Or the Obama administration’s last-
year actions might suggest a fleeting confluence of circum-
stances—a second-term President, one who thought he would
be succeeded by a political ally, facing an opposition party in
Congress whose members can credibly commit the party lead-
ership not to pass revenue-raising measures.  “Prediction is
difficult, especially about the future.”372  What does seem evi-
dent, though, is that if a future President decides to exercise
the full range of his (or her) power to tax under existing stat-
utes, he or she will find that long-latent power to be vast
indeed.
372 This quotation is often attributed, with slightly different phrasings, to both
Niels Bohr and Yogi Berra, though its true origins are unclear. See Letters to the
Editor: The Inbox, The Perils of Prediction, June 2nd, THE ECONOMIST (July 15,
2007), http://www.economist.com/blogs/theinbox/2007/07/the_perils_of_pre
diction_june [https://perma.cc/4B4F-7DGX].
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